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Dissatisfaction with the criminal law system has resulted in a call for alternative responses to issues 
relating to crime and injustice.  Restorative justice programs are one of these alternative responses. 
Restorative justice is a process in which the victim, offender, and any other party affected by crime 
partake actively in resolving matters arising from the crime, often with the help of a facilitator. 
This research work seeks to defend the use of restorative justice programs by defending 
Braithwaite's version of restorative justice over Christie's more radical version, explaining how 
restorative justice is opposed to 'retributivism', and by providing a Kantian elaboration on 
Braithwaite's notions of dignity and freedom.  The thesis argues that only by applying a Kantian 
notion of freedom and dignity to Braithwaite's account of restorative justice can restorative justice 
adequately defend itself against the criticisms made by people like Acorn and Geeraets. Only with 
a Kantian modification can restorative justice show how the decisions reached in a restorative 
justice process are not based on mere emotion or emotional coercion, but the rational deliberation 
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Canada is one of many countries in the world that uses restorative justice programs.  On 
the Government of Canada website, there is an account of restorative justice that includes a 
definition of restorative justice, an account of the values and principles that inform the restorative 
justice approach, and a brief account of three kinds of restorative justice programs.  However, I 
would argue that this account of restorative justice raises questions that need answering.   
On the Canadian government fact sheet, restorative justice is described as a philosophy and 
an approach that deals with the harm done to people and relationships as a result of the crime.  It 
is defined as "…a non-adversarial, non-retributive approach to justice that emphasizes healing in 
victims, meaningful accountability of offenders, and the involvement of citizens in creating 
healthier, safer communities."1 
The government of Canada then provides a long list of values and principles that provide 
the basis of the restorative justice approach.  The values and principles include the recognition of 
harm, inclusion, accountability, facilitated dialogue, truth, voluntary participation, safety, choice, 
holism, humanism, and reparation.2  There is an attempt to explain some of these values and 
principles.  For instance, the value of 'recognition of harm' involves attempts to determine who is 
hurt, what their needs are, and how to resolve them. It is about acknowledging the different kinds 
of harmful effects on individuals and the community from a criminal offense.3  For the victim, the 
damage could include loss of property or injury, but also a loss of security or dignity.  It entails 
the act of acknowledgment that damage has been done to parties involved in a conflict and seeking 
ways to heal the harm. As another example, the value of 'voluntary participation' is explained as 
requiring the active involvement and uncoerced participation of all people affected by crime in the 
restoration process.4 This value of voluntary participation entails the value of 'inclusion' of the 
parties by giving all those affected by an offense a voice, allowing for accessibility, and handling 
of their conflicts by themselves rather than appointing legal professionals, or any other secondary 
 
1  Correctional Service of Canada, Communications. “About Restorative Justice,” Government of Canada, 
Corrective Service of Canada, Communications and Citizens Engagement Sector, Restorative Justice, 13 Jan. 
2014, www.csc-sec.gc.ca/restorative-justice/003005-007-eng.shtml. 
2  Ibid.  In their elaboration of specific values and principles, they also add “transformation” and “interaction” to the 
long list of values and principles. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
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party as a stakeholder in the meeting. Family members and well-wishers do not speak for the victim 
or offender but provide social support in the circles or conferencing as the case may be. Parties 
involved in a meeting, regardless of age, sex/gender, or race, should voluntarily indulge in sessions 
based on free choice.  The value of "accountability" relates specifically to the offender and strives 
to ensure that offenders take responsibility for the crime and the damage they caused by their 
actions. 5 It involves an opportunity for the offender to own up to his action that resulted in the 
crime.  Since the restorative justice process may also involve community participation, the value 
of 'accountability' can also provide the opportunity for the community to understand and take 
responsibility for the root causes of crime. 6 The value of 'facilitated dialogue' emphasizes the fact 
that communication between parties involved in a conflict is essential. This communication could 
be direct or indirect, but a dialogue between those directly affected by the criminal offense is 
encouraged.  These values, in addition to values like truth, holism, humanism, and even 
transformation and interaction, are considered a part of the restorative justice approach. 
On the government of Canada website, three kinds of restorative justice processes are 
highlighted (thus, restorative justice processes include these three, but are not limited to these 
three). In Canada, restorative justice programs include Victim-Offender mediation, Restorative 
Conferencing, and Circle processes.  Let me provide a brief account of each kind, before explaining 
the questions raised by the Canadian account of restorative justice. 
Other sources and other jurisdictions also acknowledge the three main categories of 
practices in restorative justice listed by the government of Canada.  For example, in the Handbook 
on Restorative Justice Programs, these three kinds of restorative justice programs, namely victim-
offender mediation, restorative conferencing, and circle processes, are also included.7 First, victim-
offender mediation employs trained mediators to convene victims and offenders to discuss their 
experiences caused by the crime and ways to agree on a resolution to the conflict.8   Thus, victim-
offender programs are set up to address the needs of victims and offenders. They ensure offenders 
are held accountable for their offense. The process can take place in settings like meeting rooms, 
 
5  Ibid 
6  Ibid. 
7  Yvon Dandurant, “Handbook on restorative justice programs,” Criminal Justice handbook Series.  (United Nations 
Publication, 2006), pp. 15 – 16. 
8  Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime. “Home Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime.” 




churches, libraries, or even the home of the victim if agreed upon by both parties.  For the 
mediation to resolve properly, the offender must accept responsibility for the crime, and the 
voluntary participation by the victim and offender is necessary.  
In restorative conferencing, the victim, the offender, their family members, and other 
members of the community work toward restoration, and a trained third party usually facilitates 
it.9 In community conferencing, programs are usually managed by community groups.  The 
community justice coordinator moderates this process, and it mostly applies to the juvenile justice 
system.10   Again, restorative conferencing most often takes place in schools, police facility, or in 
a welfare building. In the proceeding, the offender speaks first, followed by the victims and other 
participants. 11 
Circle sentencing involves bringing together members of the community, which includes 
the victim, offender, and elders, to discuss the impact of crime and the way forward. 12 As the term 
indicates, circles occur at the sentencing stage (i.e., after a trial or after a guilty plea).  In a circle 
sentencing setting, the participants, family members, and community residents sit down facing one 
another in circle. Target groups, in this case, are offenders who take responsibility and express 
willingness to change. It is often carried out by a community coordinator in the school or 
community building. The order of process involves the passing of a feather or talking stick to 
enable parties involved in a crime to express their experiences; in this case, the victim speaks 
first.13 
However, there are questions raised by the Canadian approach and understanding of 
restorative justice, which I intend to address in this thesis. For example, the Canadian definition 
of restorative justice raises a question bordering on how restorative justice can be non-adversarial 
and non-retributive.  What does it mean for restorative justice to be non-adversarial and non-
retributive? Does this mean that restorative justice is opposed to the use of punishments?  The 
definition also raises the question of how such a process can fit into a criminal legal system that 
does have retributive and adversarial elements. Should restorative justice be taken to as a 
 
9  Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime.  “Home: Federal Ombudsman for Victims 
10  McLaughlin, Eugene. Restorative Justice: Critical Issues. Sage Publ., 2003. p.79. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime. “Home: Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime.” 
Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, 23 Oct. 2017, www.victimsfirst.gc.ca/res/pub/gfo-
ore/RJ.html. 
13  McLaughlin, Eugene.  Restorative Justice Critical Issues.  Sage Publ., 2003. p.79. 
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movement to overthrow the current criminal legal system, or can it work in connection with such 
a retributivist and punitive system? 
The long list of values and principles raises questions of how all these values and principles 
can be part of one process and whether some of these values are more central or core values. 
Without clarification of the core values of restorative justice, it is difficult to understand how 
restorative justice processes differ from other processes in the criminal legal system. This long list 
of values also raises questions about whether restorative justice processes are being characterized 
in an overly idealized fashion. How can one realistically expect any response to crime to live up 
to each one of these values and principles?   
Finally, although the Canadian government uses victim-offender mediation, restorative 
conferencing, and sentencing circles, questions arise in the accounts of these programs.  More 
specifically, the question of how restorative justice can serve the diverse needs of victims and 
offenders with the same process.  Further, if community involvement is a part of the process, then 
how can one process be expected to 'restore' the victim, offender, and community at the same time?  
The descriptions of restorative justice programs also raise questions about the rights of offenders 
and victims, and how restorative justice can achieve some of its aims without manipulation or 
coercion.  How can such a process ensure the voluntary and active participation without any 
possible pressure or manipulation?  How can one achieve goals of reconciliation by forcing 
participants to feel compassion or to apologize or to forgive? Finally, the description of restorative 
justice processes also raises questions on whether the goals of restorative justice are too ambitious 
or idealized. 
As I will show in Chapter Three, critics of restorative justice often argue that restorative 
justice processes involve either the manipulation of emotions ("compulsory compassion", for 
example) or the coercion that comes from the limited options for criminals (for example, where 
criminals are forced to choose between participation in restorative justice processes or a harsh 
prison sentence by a judge).  How can such a process ensure the voluntary and active participation 
without any possible pressure or manipulation? The concepts of 'manipulation' and 'coercion' are 
complicated notions.  In Chapter Three, I will be agreeing with the Kantian understanding of 
manipulation in terms of treating people as "mere means" to an end.  Further, the notion of coercion 
is complicated by the need to acknowledge the autonomy of people and this, in turn, might be 
impacted by the lack of opportunities that some people face in light of belonging to historically 
5 
 
disadvantaged groups in society. Any adequate account of restorative justice must respond to and 
deal with the possibility of both manipulation and coercion in restorative justice processes. 
 In this thesis, I will aim to defend restorative justice by answering some of these kinds of 
questions. To do this, I will consider the accounts of restorative justice given by two prominent 
theorists on restorative justice, namely Nils Christie and John Braithwaite.  Both have to provide 
reports of restorative justice that have been very influential.  However, in this thesis, I will argue 
that Braithwaite's version of restorative justice is more plausible and less problematic than the 
account given by Christie.  Although Braithwaite's version is more credible, there are two kinds of 
shortcomings in his account of restorative justice that need to be addressed. 
  First, although Braithwaite explains restorative justice in terms of its opposition to 
retributivism, he does not adequately explain what he means by retributivism; as a result, his 
account of restorative justice is unclear.  Second, in explaining his account of restorative justice, 
Braithwaite will emphasize the story of Sam, a composite story of a young offender involved in a 
restorative justice process.  This story, I will argue, provides a picture of restorative justice 
processes as involving an over-reliance or over-dependence on emotions.  This picture makes 
Braithwaite's version of restorative justice more easily subject to the criticisms of people like 
Acorn and Geeraets. In this thesis, I will strive to overcome these two shortcomings by first 
outlining some different kinds of retributivism, and by providing a Kantian elaboration of 
Braithwaite's notions of "dignity" and "freedom as non-domination." 
In the first chapter, I will defend Braithwaite's approach to restorative justice over Christie's 
more radical version of restorative justice.  I will do this by first presenting Christie's account of 
restorative justice and explaining how radical his version of restorative justice is in terms of its 
goals.  I will show that Christie's account fails to acknowledge the importance of the Western 
criminal justice system in relation to restorative justice practice. In the second section, I will 
explain Braithwaite's account of restorative justice with an appeal to the fable of Sam and his 
account of reintegrative shame.  I will also explain how Braithwaite explains the 'restoration' of 
victims, offenders, and the community, as well as his account of how the core values of restorative 
justice are conceived in opposition to retributivism and the Western approach to criminal legal 
practice. In this way, I will address some of the questions that arose from my brief consideration 
of the Canadian approach (for example, clarifying the "core" or central values and explaining how 
one process can "restore" victims, offenders, and the community).   Finally, I will explain both the 
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strengths and weaknesses of Braithwaite's account of restorative justice.  I will show why 
Braithwaite's account of restorative justice is more plausible than Christie's version.  One of the 
reasons for preferring Braithwaite's account is that his version allows for the two systems of justice 
(restorative justice and the Western approach to criminal justice) to work together.  Braithwaite, 
unlike Christie, believes that restorative justice processes are more useful when they are being 
used to check the excesses of the Western criminal legal approach and vice versa.  The Western 
criminal legal approach is needed to ensure that the rights of all participants within restorative 
justice processes are protected.  The Western criminal legal approach is also needed when 
offenders and victims do not agree to participate in restorative justice processes or when parties to 
a conflict in restorative justice do not comply with an agreement.  Despite these advantages to 
Braithwaite's approach to restorative justice, I will also show that there are two shortcomings in 
Braithwaite's account that require being addressed.  As I mentioned, the first shortcoming deals 
with his inadequate account of retributivism, while the second shortcoming deals with the over-
reliance on emotions in his story of Sam.  I will address the first shortcoming in the next chapter 
(Chapter Two) and then address the second shortcoming in the third and final Chapter. 
The second chapter aims to  explain the different senses of retributivism by examining the 
influential work of H.L.A. Hart's Punishment and Responsibility:  Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law, published in 1968.  In this work, Hart makes a number of distinctions that are relevant to the 
characterization of retributivism.  In the first section, I will examine his distinctions between 
defining punishment and justifying punishment, as well as his distinction between the general 
justifying aim for a system of punishment and questions of distribution.  These distinctions will 
enable us to distinguish retribution as a general justifying aim from retribution in distribution.  In 
the second section, I will turn to his postscript in Punishment and Responsibility, where he 
introduces a distinction between crude retributivism and a modified version of retributivism.  The 
crude version of retributivism is reflected in biblical views of retribution and a strict interpretation 
of Kant.  Although most contemporary academic defenders of retributivism would disagree with 
this crude version, the crude version does reflect common views of criminal justice in public.  The 
modified version introduces three kinds of modification and represents a view of retributivism 
more aligned with contemporary academic defenders of retributivism.  With these distinctions in 
mind, I will, in the final section of this chapter, relate these versions of retributivism to 
Braithwaite's account of restorative justice. I will show that Braithwaite's account of restorative 
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justice, as opposed to crude retributivism in all its forms, is not opposed to a modified version of 
proportionate retributivism in distribution an that act as a check on restorative justice processes. 
Braithwaite's account does seem to reject retributivism in all its forms as the general justifying aim 
of the system of punishment.   
The third and final chapter of this thesis aims to defend the stance of Braithwaite against 
criticisms made by Acorn and Geereats.  Both of these critics are concerned with both the reliance 
on emotions and emotional compulsion, as well as the overly idealized and illusory account of 
restorative justice.  In the first section, I will explain the main elements of Annalise Acorn's 
criticism from her book "Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice."14  In the 
second section, I will further explain the main criticisms made by Geeraets in his article "Fictions 
of Restorative Justice."15  Geeraets presents three claims which he unmasks as fictions. The first 
claim is that the offender and victim do not attend restorative meetings voluntarily.16 The offender, 
for Geeraets, has a limited choice between the punitive criminal trial and restorative justice 
practice.Based on this, Geeraets explains that "it is inappropriate to describe the offender's consent 
to participate in terms of volition." Geeraets explains that there is a strong incentive for the victims 
to participate and do so in a "positive and reasonable manner."17 The second claim is that parties 
to a conflict do not actively participate in the conflict. The parties to a conflict, for Geeraets, do 
not, in the real sense, determine the outcome of the meetings; the determinant factor is emotions. 
Finally, Geeraets argues that the view that restorative justice involves no intentional infliction of 
harm is false. Finally, in the third section, I will defend a modified version of Braithwaite's account 
of restorative justice against these criticisms by Acorn and Geeraets. The philosophical problem 
here is that the critics propose that the features of restorative justice are not what it claims to be 
and it is not applicable in the real world, in the sense that any attempt to provide a restorative 
remedy to justice is fictitious. In the same vein, it is adequate to point out that emotions exist in 
two senses. First, emotions can be a tool for manipulation in a way of making a person do what 
they would not normally want to do. On the other hand, emotion backed up by reason results in a 
good outcome  because the person can make decisions for himself by employing the ability to 
 
14  Acorn, Annalise.  Compulsory Compassionate: A Critique of Restorative Justice. UBC Press, 2004. 
15 Geeraets, V. Criminal Law and Philosophy.  Springerpub.com, 2019. www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
271741109_Fictions_of_Restorative_Justice_Vincent_Geeraets.  Accessed 25th April 2020. 
16   Ibid., p.266. 
17   Ibid.. 
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rationalize. However, I  will argue that Kantian notions of dignity and freedom are a crucial 
elaboration needed for Braithwaite's account of restorative justice to be more defensible.  I will 
show that such a Kantian version of restorative justice is not dependent on mere emotion or 
compulsory compassion. I will also show that such a Kantian version of Braithwaite's restorative 
justice is not a fictitious theory, but one whose aims are realistic. Since each parties' ability to 
freely make decisions as rational beings are reinforced, as well as the importance of respecting the 
dignity of all participants in the process,  restorative justice provides the real possibility for a 
genuine apology and forgiveness to occur naturally. I will also show that such a Kantian 
modification on Braithwaite's view of restorative justice is not overly ambitious, as presented by 
some of its more radical proponents. Still, like any other human process, it is not free from 
inadequacies caused by human errors or the limitations of any human response to crime. Thus, by 
the end of this thesis, I hope to have adequately defended this Kantian elaboration of Braithwaite's 





















DEFENDING BRAITHWAITE'S VERSION OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE OVER CHRISTIE'S 
 
1.0  Introduction  
This chapter aims to show how Braithwaite's version of restorative justice is an 
improvement upon Christie's more radical version.  I will begin by explaining Christie's position, 
which represents a rejection of both legal professionals (and the criminal justice system) and 
rehabilitation professionals (psychologists, sociologists, social workers, and so on). He calls them 
both “professional thieves”.18 He also presents his restorative approach as opposed to modern post-
industrial society - these are the structural thieves.19 Christie presents restorative justice as 
overthrowing, not just the criminal justice system, but society at large. I will also show that this 
view is problematic as restorative justice cannot solve social injustice issues. 
Later in the chapter, I  will present Braithwaite's modified version of restorative justice by 
first explaining the fable of Sam, explaining Braithwaite's theory of shame, and how Braithwaite 
explains his theory of reintegrative shaming as opposed to stigmatizing shaming in his story on 
Sam. In the next subsection, I will explain Braithwaite's three main aims of restorative justice 
practice (restoring victims, restoring offenders, and communities).20 Restoration, for Braithwaite, 
is to heal and restore the security, dignity, and to empower all parties involved in a conflict as 
much as possible. In  this  section, I will discuss  the universality of the values of restorative justice 
versus the importance of retributive justice, according to Braithwaite's view will be explained. In 
this section, Braithwaite acknowledges the universality of restorative and retributive values; 
although, for him, the relevance of retributive values is in times past because, in modern times, 
cultures tend towards value for repair and not value for punishing an offender.21 
The main benefits of restorative justice put forward by Braithwaite are the Healing 
relationships of all parties involved in a conflict. Secondly, community deliberation consists of 
putting the crime in the center, the idea of freedom through non-domination, which includes the 
equal participation of the victim and offender in a circle without the domination of one of the 
 
18   McLaughlin, Eugene, Restorative Justice: Critical Issues.  Sage Publ., 2003. p.22. 
19   Ibid., p.23. 
20   Ibid., pp56-61. 
21   Ibid., p.61 
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parties.22 One can achieve this through respectful listening. In the final section, I will present the 
strengths and weaknesses of Braithwaite's view. One significant advantage in Braithwaite's version 
of restorative justice is that it does not view the criminal justice system as irrelevant. Still, it 
considers both methods of justice as a check for the excesses of the other, and it acknowledges the 
role of the criminal justice system in cases that involve serious crimes or lack of cooperation by 
an offender to fulfill an agreement reached in a healing circle. 
On the contrary, the fable of Sam with its overemphasis on emotions does not represent a 
secure version of what restorative justice  represents. It makes it seem like the success of a 
restorative meeting is tied to persuasion through the ability of both parties involved in a conflict 
to appeal emotionally to each other. However, this is not what Braithwaite aims to achieve as he 
holds the view that apology and forgiveness are the “natural gifts of respectful listening”23 It 
follows that any contrary means (including forgiveness or apology based on mere emotional 
persuasion) would not suffice in restorative meetings. 
 
1.1   Christie's Account of Restorative Justice  
In "Conflicts as Property," Christie holds the view that criminology tends to characterize 
crime and punishment in a way that takes the conflict away from the parties directly involved in 
the conflict. Christie explains that Western criminal court systems are such that "...the directly 
involved parties in a conflict do not even attend their court cases."24 Thus, in actual criminal trials, 
conflicts are taken away from the parties directly affected by the conflict. The cases of individuals 
in the criminal justice system are organized and defended by legal professionals like the lawyer 
and judge. As such, it does not include the direct parties affected by the conflict. In this case, 
parties involved in a conflict are passive. Now their conflict has become "other people's 
property."25 
Christie presents two contrasting examples of societies that experience conflict. In the first 
example, Christie presents a conflict case in Tanzania. 26Resolving the dispute takes place in a 
crowded house with people in a good mood, communicating with one another. The case involves 
 
22   Ibid., p.157 
23   Ibid., p.36. 
24   Ibid. 
25   Ibid. 




a couple who were engaged, later had some misunderstanding, and decided to end the relationship. 
Christie describes how Tanzania approaches a resolution to this conflict.27 Christie explained that: 
 
The parties, the former lovers, were in the center of the room and 
the center of everyone's attention. They talked often and were 
eagerly listened to. Close to them were relatives and friends who 
also took part, but they did not take over. There was also 
participation from the general audience with short questions, 
information, or jokes. The judges, three local party secretaries, 
were extremely inactive. They were ignorant with regard to 
village matters. All the other people in the room were experts. 
They were experts on norms as well as actions. And they 
crystallized norms and clarified what had happened through 
participation in the procedure. No reporters attended. They were 
all there.28 
 
The structure of how the case was handled is what Christie aims to present. From the above 
quotation, one can deduce about five elements from Christie’s argument. The parties involved in 
the conflict were situated in the center, both the victim and offender shared their experiences and 
were both listened to. In this case, they "own" their conflicts. Even though family members and 
friends of the parties involved are at the meeting, the victim and the offender remain most actively 
engaged in the resolution process. The judges, although present, do not partake in the case.  
Although Christie knows that the Tanzania case is an example of civil conflict, he believes that 
this case is relevant for understanding our responses to crimes.29  
In the second example, Christie criticizes the process of resolving conflicts in the Western 
criminal legal system of Scandinavia. He explains that aside from the fact that modern criminal 
courts are inaccessible and intimidating, in a criminal justice system proceeding, "...the parties are 
 
27   Ibid. 
28   Ibid. 
29  Ibid., p.3. Christie is clearly challenging the Western separation between civil and criminal law.  In Western legal 
systems, civil law is considered a ‘private’ matter between individual and focuses on repair of harm done to private 
individuals, while criminal law is considered “public” matter involving the state and focuses on public wrongs 
done.  Here he hints at the idea that the Western view of criminal law may be too narrow or inherently problematic. 
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being represented, the proceeding is converted from something between the concrete parties into 
a conflict between one of the parties and the state."30 The point for Christie is that society has little 
knowledge of how the courts operate. He explains that the courts are not accessible by the ordinary 
person in society.  
 In the Western legal approach to criminal justice, a case mostly involves the offender and 
the judge without the attendance of the victim or any other participant involved in the process. 
Christie calls this "criminal conflict."31 In this case, the victim does not participate in the conflict 
and has "lost the case to the state."32 Christie also finds the interaction between the victim and the 
offender very minimal and demands for adequate interaction and representation of the parties 
involved in a conflict. This is due to how they are trained to handle conflicts. Christie calls lawyers, 
“professional thieves”33, believing that lawyers resolve cases often for their personal gain and in 
the process disengage parties directly involved in a conflict from participation. 
 Christie argues that "there are many honorable and dishonorable reasons"34 why legal 
professionals "steal" conflicts away from those directly involved.  The excellent or honorable 
aspect is that it fosters the state's need for conflict reduction and certainly also its wishes for the 
protection of the victim. The dishonorable reason for this stealing of conflict, for Christie, is that 
"whoever is in power uses the criminal case for personal gain."35  
Christie argues that the thieves of the conflict are more interested in converting the image 
of the case from one of conflict into one of non-conflict. The point here is that the handlers of 
conflict that Christie describes aims at arriving at a state where the case of offense has attained 
closure. Closure is the main goal without considering the participation or empowerment of the real 
owners of the conflict (victim, offender, and community). In the same vein, Christie argues that 
there are two types of conflict thieves: the "professional thieves and structural thieves."36 
 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid., p.3 
32  Ibid.  In a Western criminal legal system, the victims of crime either do not participate at all or their role is reduced 
to the role of a mere witness.  Since Christie has written this article, there have been moves within Western legal 
systems to allow for a role for victims at the sentencing stage (see victims impact statements, for example). 
33   Ibid.,4. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid.  Here Christie is pointing to the fact that lawyers in particular make a living off this kind of theft.  However, 
he also believes that there is an entire industry of rehabilitative experts (like psychologists, psychiatrists, 
sociologists and criminologists) that also make a living from stealing conflicts from those directly involved. 
36  Ibid. p.4.  Professional thieves for Christie entail, lawyers, social workers, criminologists and psychologists who 




For Christie, "changes in societal structures"37 have also resulted in the manipulation of 
conflicts, and thus such changes represent what Christie calls "structural" thieves. Christie 
describes two kinds of segmentation that occurs in modern industrial society.   First, there is what 
he calls a "segmentation in space," which he describes in terms of functionalization of our lives.  
In this way, he is describing how, in modern industrial society, we only know people according to 
the roles they play and not as persons.38 Christie believes that knowing people according to the 
role they play or jobs they perform, for instance, in the office or at school, would not enable us to 
understand who they are as people and why they behave as they do.  
The second type of segmentation in society relates to the hierarchical placement of people 
in community or segmentation based on "...our reestablishment of caste society."39 He has in mind 
hierarchical organizations of institutions and other groups based on "biological attributes such as 
sex, color, physical handicaps or the number of winters passed since birth." 40 Both kinds of 
segmentation or fragmentations, according to Christie, lead to the depersonalization of social life 
(and an inability to cope with conflicts), the destruction of conditions for living conflicts (i.e., 
fewer conflicts), and the making of all other conflicts invisible (and thus with no resolution).41  
Christie sees these as the three consequences of segmentation or fragmentation found in modern 
Western societies.  With the depersonalization of social life, we do not know who our workmates, 
for instance, are aside from being workmates, and we cannot deal with conflicts except in a formal 
or administered way. With the destruction of conditions for living conflicts, certain kinds of 
conflicts are no longer recognized or seen (for example, he points to a decrease of crimes of infamy 
and libel as a "sad symptom of dangerous developments" in contemporary society).   
Finally, by presenting conflicts as invisible, he points to both the extremes of over-
privatized conflicts (like domestic abuse and child abuse). He also points out to other extremes of 
the inability to see crimes carried out by economic organizations that are so large that individuals 
hardly notice when they get victimized.42 
 
try to resolve the conflict or solve the problem by employing various professional techniques in the field to 
manipulate and study the offender and victim. 
37  McLaughlin, Eugene. Restorative Justice: Critical Issues.  Sage Publ., 2003. p.23 
38  Ibid. 
39  Nils Christie, “Conflicts as property”.  The British Journals of Criminology, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 1977, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a046783.  P2. 
40  McLaughlin, Eugene.  Restorative Justice:  Critical Issues. Saga Publ., 2003. p.24. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. p.25. 
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In a fragmented or segmented society such as ours, Christie explains that there would be 
misconceptions between victims and offenders, coupled with an inability to recognize and deal 
with conflicts. In the case of the offender, he has "lost the opportunity to explain himself to a 
person whose evaluation of him might have mattered."43  And when conflicts become a matter of 
public concern, the conflict is taken away from those directly involved and handled by both legal 
professionals and "treatment" or rehabilitative experts. 
Christie explains that the process involves a meeting between the offender and the victim 
in a conflict, even if it should be done independently of the offender's wish. He views it as 
necessary for the victim and offender to be able to confront one another and handle their conflicts. 
He states that he has no direct interest in "treatment or improvement of criminals."44  A 
rehabilitative approach with "treatment personnel" is just as much a problem for Christie as the 
more "retributive" approach of the criminal legal system and its legal professionals.  According to 
Christie, a rehabilitative approach with its professional treatment professionals ends up 
“converting” the conflict into one of non-conflict, by focusing on the offender as a patient in need 
of expert treatment.  He believes that this undermines the offender's responsibility and 
accountability for his or her actions, by viewing the offense as a mere symptom of an underlying 
problem with the offender that needs treating.  Christie believes that a restorative justice approach 
can acknowledge the responsibility of offenders for their actions, while also returning the conflict 
to the people directly involved.  This usher in Christie's idea of victim-oriented courts. 
Christie explains that the first stage of the victim-oriented court will be a traditional one. 
"…whether it is established, whether it is true that the law has been broken, and whether it was 
this particular person who broke it."45 The point here is that the conflict will be tried in a criminal 
court system to find out if the offender is truly the one who committed an offense. The second 
stage is such that: "the victim's situation was considered, where every detail regarding what had 
happened, legally relevant or not, was brought to the court's attention."46 At this point, the victim 
communicates by explaining in detail what happened. The victim expresses how he felt and what 
 
43  Nils Christie,  “Conflicts as property.”  The British Journal of Criminology,  Volume 17, Issue 1, January 1977, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a046783. p.9 
44  Ibid., p.27. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
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he suffered, and then agreements are reached on what can be done for the victim by "the offender, 
the local neighborhood, and the state."47  
The third stage entails the stage of punishment, where punishment would be meted out to 
the offender by the judge "in addition to the unintended sufferings; the offender would go through 
visavis the victim."48 The fourth stage involves the  “stage for service to the offender."49 Service 
could be social, medical, educational, or religious. For instance, one service would involve funding 
an offender's education to enable him to attend college, which has always been the dream of that 
offender. But Christie points out that the idea is not to avoid "further crime but because needs 
ought to be met."50 
A final point for Christie is that he advocates for "a lay oriented court."51 For Christie, this 
is a court devoid of specialization or professionals like lawyers, criminologists, and so on. This 
sort of court entails "...a court of equals representing themselves, no judges are needed."52 Christie 
explains that lawyers could involve themselves in stage one, where the criminal is in a trial. He 
says that "...experts are as cancer to any lay body."53 Christie's point is that the experts (lawyers, 
psychologists, sociologists, and criminologists) should not specialize in resolving crime. Instead, 
in avoidable situations, they should stand in the gap as "resource persons, answering when asked 
but not domineering in the center."54 The point here is that professionals might help to inform the 
process, but should never be allowed to "take them over."55 
 
1.2 Analysis of how Radical his Account is and the Problem with such a 
Radical Account 
As stated in the previous section, Christie is right to recognize that the problems with 
modern industrial society do have an impact on crime and how we respond to crime.56These 
problems include the segregation of people based on race, color, age, and so on. Some group of 
 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid., p.28. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid., p.29 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid., p.24 
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people have more privileges than others based on recognized differences. In the same vein, this 
socio-political issue influences the criminal justice system; society groups victims and offenders 
into classes based on their race, color, social class, and age. The law favors the majority of the 
population with the highest level of influence. For instance, in some societies, court proceedings 
favor racial minorities less than the majority.  
Christie is also right to say that within modern industrial society, our sense of community 
is undermined and that we relate to each other in a more "depersonalized" and functionalized 
fashion.57 Modern society is individualistic, and it has resulted in an estranged behavior of a person 
to another. He is also right to say that we often rely on the state or institutions to resolve our 
conflicts, and we feel unable to deal with our conflicts.  Finally, Christie is also right about how 
the victim is excluded from criminal legal processes and how they often feel victimized by the 
process.58 Victims in the criminal justice system do not participate actively in their case. Instead, 
the victim is represented by the lawyer who converses with the offender. When this happens, the 
victim has no chance to express himself in a case that involved him. The victim has no opportunity 
to know the offender and the experiences that led to the crime. He is only left with the emotions 
of anger, anxiety, and fright.59  However, Christie's account of restorative practice is extreme, and 
this is problematic. 
One shortcoming in Christie's view is that he tries to deny the need for the consent of the 
offender to meet with the victim in what he calls confrontation with the victim. He argues:  “we 
should do it quite independently of his wishes."60 The issue here is that not allowing parties 
involved in a conflict to discuss the effects of a crime and the way forward would be infringing on 
the significant feature of restorative justice, which is active participation  Just as Christie criticizes 
the criminal justice system for the stealing of conflicts by not allowing for active participation in 
the process, he is now proposing that the offender need not ‘voluntarily’ participate in the 
restorative justice process; this would be no different from that idea of stealing conflicts, a view 
that Christie explicitly criticizes. 
Another point relating to the offender that Christie argues about is that in the fourth stage 
of the victim-oriented court, Christie states that these needs are met not to prevent crime from 
 
57  Ibid., p.24 
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59  Ibid. 
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reoccurring but "because needs ought to be met."61 I ask," what then is the aim of meeting the 
offenders' need"? One feature of restorative justice as a practice is to be forward-looking and 
consider the impact of actions on all people. How can restorative justice be forward-looking 
without trying, as much as possible, to avoid a reoccurrence of that crime in the future?  Thus, the 
goal of meeting the offender's needs must involve a consideration of how to prevent recidivism. 
The duty here is to diagnose the underlying cause of a criminal act for the offender and find 
solutions for the betterment of the victim, offender, and the community itself. One of the goals of 
a community representative in the meeting would be to find out the possible causes of an offense 
- in the case of a particular offender and for other potential offenders and to find ways in which it 
can be mitigated at the time and in the future.  
Also, I think that Chirstie’s argument on the establishment of a lay oriented court is 
problematic when he explains that "the Ideal is clear; it ought to be the court of equals representing 
themselves. When they can find a solution between themselves, no judges are needed. When they 
are not, the judges ought to be their equals."62 The point here is what I will call radical restorative 
justice practice. It has to do with the overhaul of the criminal legal system of trials and even prisons 
by restorative justice. By advocating for the replacement of professionals by those with "lay 
orientation" (or reducing the role of professionals to mere "resource" persons), Christie is 
advocating for a radical change in the legal system and rehabilitation services.  He is advocating 
that the conflicts of the victim and offender be handled by the owners of the conflict and not 
professional bodies (whether legal professionals like lawyers and judges, or treatment experts like 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers), which he views to steal the conflict to put an end 
to it. More specifically, Christie argues for the irrelevance of legal practitioners like lawyers and 
judges in the lay court. He goes further to explain: "let us try to get them to perceive themselves 
as resource persons, answering when asked, but not domineering, not in the center."63  
I do not agree with this view because, in cases where the offender refuses to participate in 
the program, it cannot easily be followed up to ensure he does not abscond.   Consider a scenario 
where a victim and offender reach an agreement mandating the offender to clean up the house of 
the victim three times a week;  if the offender fails to keep to the agreements continuously, how 
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can we ensure that the rights of all people are respected in a process governed entirely by 
laypeople?  Are there not meant to be checks and balances by a legitimizing body like the criminal 
justice system to protect the rights of all participants?   I am of the view that restorative justice 
should be viewed as a supplement to the Western retributive criminal justice system and vice versa, 
not as a total replacement of the Western criminal justice system. I will come back to this point 
later in section 1.4. 
The radical nature of Christie's version of restorative justice is clear from the opposition he 
draws between restorative justice and modern industrial society (with all its fragmentation and 
depersonalized relationships). Christie supports a communitarian view of society and, thus, rejects 
the individualism of modern society.  However, I would argue that there are good elements in our 
contemporary society.  For example, although fragmented, our society supports individual choice 
and self-determination by promoting individual rights and freedoms.  Our society allows for 
freedom of tastes and pursuits for individuals and toleration of diversity that is absent in past 
communitarian societies. Although Christie does point to some shortcomings with contemporary 
society, he does not acknowledge the advantages of modern industrialized society, advantages 
which other proponents of restorative justice like Braithwaite can and do acknowledge. By 
characterizing restorative justice in opposition to the structural elements of modern industrial 
society, Christie presents restorative justice as the solution not just to the problems with the 
Western criminal legal system (and even to the socio-psychological rehabilitative/medical 
system), but also as a solution to the problems with society in general! It represents restorative 
justice as having overly lofty ambitions, which are far too unrealistic for restorative justice 
processes even to try to accomplish. 
 
1.3. The story of Sam and Braithwaite's – an analysis in terms of stigmatizing 
shame versus reintegrative shame   
John Braithwaite, as a strong restorative justice proponent in his book Crime Shame and 
Reintegration, explained his view on restorative justice. Braithwaite begins with the fable of Sam 
to show some features of restorative justice. It involves an adolescent offender who attended a 
diversionary restorative justice conference. Braithwaite says that his story is a "composite" of 
several Sams he has seen (thus, while based on real stories, he admits that this is not a real story). 
He represents the story of Sam as a cornerstone of the true story of restorative justice. Sam, who 
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is homeless and says his parents abused him, has no one who cares about him except his older 
sister, his former hockey coach at school, and his Uncle George. These people attend the 
conference, along with the elderly female victim and her daughter. 
Sam says he knocked over the victim and took her purse because he needed the money. 
His significant others rebuke him for doing this, but also remembers that he was a good person 
before he started getting into trouble. Next, the victim and daughter describe the effects of the 
robbery, but Sam does not seem to be affected. After his callous response to the victim, Sam's 
sister cries, and during a break, she reveals that she too had been abused by their parents; she 
finally seems to reach Sam by "looking straight into his eyes with love and strength."64 When the 
conference reconvenes, Sam's sister speaks directly to Sam, and without mentioning details, says 
she understands what Sam went through. The victim  hears this and begins to cry. Sam's callous 
exterior begins to crumble. He says he wants to do something for the victim but does not know 
what he can do without a home or job. His sister offers her place for him to stay, and the coach 
says he can offer him some work. At the end of the conference, the victim hugs Sam and tearfully 
says good luck; Sam apologizes again, and Uncle George says he will continue to help Sam and 
his sister when needed.65  
 Braithwaite explains that there has been an institutional collapse in Western criminal 
justice or legal systems due to the treatment given to victims and offenders.  He argues that Western 
criminal legal systems employ the tool of stigmatization or stigmatizing shame. These criminal 
justice systems shame offenders for who they are and thus treats them in disrespectful and 
dehumanizing manners.66 Braithwaite's central thesis is that crime rates are higher when shaming 
is stigmatizing.67 This thesis, for him, explains why some societies have higher rates of crime than 
others and why some people are more likely to offend than others. Stigmatization entails shaming 
by treating the wrongdoer without respect and characterizing them as a bad person.68 The 
individual, in this case, is labeled as an offender and treated as worthy of exclusion from law-
 
64  Braithwaite, J. “Restorative Justice and  a Better Future”,  in Eugene McLaughlin et al.  Sage Publications, 2000. 
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66  Eugene McLaughlin, Ross Fergusson, Gordon Hughes and Louise Westmorland (eds).  “Restorative Justice, 
Critical Issues,” Sage Publications, 2003.  p.55. 
67  Braithwaite, J. “Crime Shame and Reintergration”.  Cambridge University Press.  1989. p.286. 
68  Ahmed,  Eliza.  Shame Management through Reintegration.  Cambridge University Press,  2001. p.4 
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abiding society. However, Braithwaite supports the use of "reintegrative shame" in restorative 
justice processes.   
Unlike stigmatizing shame, reintegrative shame is not directed to "who" a person is and 
does not involve labels that exclude people. Thus, in reintegrative shaming, the offender is treated 
respectfully as a good person who has committed a wrong act, and efforts are being made for the 
offender to take responsibility for actions that he or she has committed. Reintegrative shame avoids 
the labeling of offenders by the voluntary act of "forgiveness or reconciliation."69 He presents the 
concept of restorative justice (with reintegrative shame) as a  solution  to the stigmatizing shaming 
that is dominant in the Western criminal justice system. 
Similarly, Braithwaite presents two theories that affect shaming. First, in the opportunity 
theory, which incorporates into the stigmatizing kind of shaming, the labeling of offenders results 
in the formation of criminal subcultures.70 This subculture formation is a product of the denial of 
opportunities for offenders that results from labeling people as criminals. For instance, if a racial 
minority living in a slum is consistently denied economic opportunities due to the stigma attached 
to their race, then criminal subcultures will form in those neighborhoods. In general, historically 
disadvantaged groups of people such as indigenous people in a colonial or post-colonial context, 
racialized minorities, people subordinated due to gender or sexual orientation and women are often 
denied the same opportunities as people from the dominant economic and social classes of society, 
and they are as a result, more likely to be stigmatized as a criminal by society. The identification 
with this criminal subculture is reinforced with a criminal legal system and a prison system that 
shames and excludes offenders for being criminals, perpetuating a cycle of reoffending.  In this 
theory, people learn from others that they identify with, both within the prison and outside, on how 
to offend, methods of rationalizing criminal acts, and the idea of criminal role models begin to 
exist.71 He also explains that building more prisons would result in worsening the effects of crime 
in society. It is because incarceration results in the offenders treated as outcasts in society, and this 
is not the right way of restoring these offenders and reintegrating them into society. In this way, 
the stigmatizing shaming of an excessively punitive criminal prison system ends up reinforcing 
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the lack of opportunity and increasing subordination of indigenous people , racialized minorities 
and other historically disadvantaged groups in society. 
The identification with this criminal subculture is reinforced with a criminal legal system 
and a prison system that shames and excludes offenders for being criminals, perpetuating a cycle 
of reoffending.  In this theory, people learn from others that they identify with, both within the 
prison and outside, on how to offend, methods of rationalizing criminal acts, and the idea of 
criminal role models begin to exist.72 He also explains that building more prisons would result in 
worsening the effects of crime in society. It is because incarceration results in the offenders being 
treated as outcasts in society, and this is not the right way of restoring these offenders and 
reintegrating them into society. 
On the other hand, control theory, for Braithwaite, evolves when offenders are reintegrated 
into society and are not stigmatized. Such an approach more naturally occurs in communities with 
high interdependency.73 When people are strongly attached to their family, friends, school, or 
employers, shaming for wrongdoing tends to be reintegrative and effective. Law-abiding identities 
are cultivated in such "interdependent communities of care."74 
Braithwaite argues that reintegrative shaming is more effective in preventing the 
reoccurrence of crime. For him, reintegrative shame does not deter only the shamed individual, it 
also deters others who wish to avoid shame but partake in offending. Another interesting point 
Braithwaite raises is that reintegrative shaming entails shame being directed not only to the 
offender but to their family, friends, or company as the case may be. The idea here is that when a 
family member or group of people are put to shame, the family or group will often treat the shame 
in a "regenerative manner."75 The family treats the act of guilt as a wrongful act not by labeling 
the child but enabling the child to see the action as a  problem to avoid. The offender who is a part 
of the family is not singled out, but the family carries out reparation while training a child.   
In stigmatizing shaming, Braithwaite explains that the offender loses their self-esteem and 
worth as a person. The idea is that social support provides a sense of "shame in terms of letting 
loved ones down by the offender.”76 By this, Braithwaite explains that including well-wishers of 
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the offender in the process helps make the offender's sense of shame be one that involves letting 
down loved family members and friends rather than the offender feeling shame for who he or she 
is.  The reason being that it helps offenders take responsibility for their actions with the support of 
the people around them.   A part of restoring the community, for Braithwaite, involves the 
introduction of social support for victims and offenders. It means that restorative justice practices 
should include not just families, but also organizations like schools, places of worship, 
neighborhoods, in professions, and so on.77 
In the case of Sam, Braithwaite's analysis would be to say that Sam's action is a result of 
the disconnectedness that Sam experiences in his family and his community. Regardless of what 
the cause of the disunity is, Sam hardly has a family or community that supports him. Braithwaite 
states that Sam is closest to his sister, who participated in the meeting. However, the method 
applied (restorative practice) to reconcile Sam (the offender) with the victim and community 
involves reintegrative shaming. The process encourages restoring relationships to those who are 
close to him, providing social circles of support based upon a shared sense of shame for what Sam 
has done helps Sam take responsibility for his actions in a lasting and supportive way.  The 
shaming, in this case, also puts crime in the center as the wrongful act by the mediator, encouraging 
Sam to communicate his experience and challenges. The idea is to solve the problem as much as 
possible in such a way that reintegrates or reconciles Sam back to society and eliminate feelings 
of failure or stigmatizing shame.  Also, the idea of forgiveness becomes a possibility with the 
victim's understanding of what Sam went through in the process of reintegrative shaming carried 
out in that restorative circle. 
For Braithwaite, criminologists hold the view that one should stigmatize the offender and 
later carry out rehabilitation on the same offender. He explains this as see-sawing between 
retribution and rehabilitation. Due to the incompetence of the systems mentioned above, 
Braithwaite resorts to restorative justice as the preferable system in tackling the issues of crime.78  
  Braithwaite defines restorative justice as the means of "restoring victims, a more victim-
centered criminal justice system, as well as restoring offenders and restoring community."79 But 
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what does it mean to restore victims, offenders, and the community?  How can one process do all 
these different things?  What values govern this process?   In the first sub-section (1.3.1), I will 
consider in more detail what it means to restore victims, offenders, and the community. In the 
second sub-section (1.3.2), I will consider the core values that inform restorative justice processes.  
Finally, in the last section of this chapter (1.4), I will provide my analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Braithwaite's version of restorative justice.  By explaining some areas of weakness 
in Braithwaite's account, I will be setting up my defense of a modified version of Braithwaite's 
account of restorative justice that will occupy the next two chapters of my thesis. 
 
1.3.1 Restorative Justice: Restoring Victims, Offenders, and Communities 
Braithwaite defines restorative justice as "restoring victims, a more victim-centered 
criminal justice system as well as restoring offenders and restoring community."80 How can one 
process work to restore the victim, offender, and the community?  First, let me examine what 
Braithwaite means by the phrase 'restoring the victim' in a restorative justice process.  In his article, 
"Restorative Justice and A Better Future," Braithwaite describes six meanings to the phrase 
'restoring the victim.'  First, in the most evident and clear sense of the word, he argues that it means 
"…restoring the property loss of the personal injury."81 Thus, if a person has been stolen from, 
restoring the victim means returning that which is lost.  If a person is injured, it means providing 
a solution as to how the injury can be healed.  However, simply returning property or healing from 
an injury will not, by itself, fully restore the victim of a crime.  The crime may have also 
undermined the victim's sense of security.  In other words, victims often feel unsafe because they 
have been assaulted or stolen from.  Simply returning the stolen property or recovering from the 
injury does not address the fear and loss of security felt by some victims.  The victim may also 
suffer a loss of dignity that triggers a shame spiral.  The victim may feel a sense of powerlessness 
or lack of agency.  Thus, Braithwaite argues that restoring the victim means more than simply 
repairing the physical harm done by the crime, whether this physical harm involves personal 
injury, property damage, or property loss. 
 
that comes with being a victim to crime for the victim and the restoration of the offender’s dignity usually taken 
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  Braithwaite enumerates five more meanings to the phrase 'restoring the victim'.  He adds, 
secondly, that restoring the victim can also mean "...restoring a sense of security".82 Thirdly, 
Braithwaite argues that it is important to restore the dignity of the offender that has been lost due 
to feelings of shame.83 The dignity of the victim is usually lost when they have been robbed; this 
can result in shame. Fourth, since disempowerment is often a part of the indignity of being a victim, 
restoring the victim also means empowering the victim.84  This happens when there is a loss of the 
victim's sense of power or a sense of ownership towards something.  The victim is encouraged to 
participate in the process and own the solution; their voice is not represented by the state.   
Fifth, the restorative justice process restores the victims in general by restoring 
"deliberative control of justice." Sixth and finally, restorative justice can restore balance and 
harmony between victim and offender, and this way makes it possible for both to be in the right 
relationship with each other.85  Braithwaite does make it clear here that with cases of social 
injustice underlying a crime (like when the poor steal from the rich or when men abuse women), 
restoration to a previous state of injustice is not a virtue.  Although restorative justice processes 
cannot deal with the social injustice underlying crime, the processes can be aware of these 
injustices and not make things worse.  
What does it mean to restore the offender?  Braithwaite argues that this restoration of the 
offender can mean "restoration of dignity" and "restoring a sense of security and empowerment."  
The offender's dignity, in this case, can be restored by confronting shame, accepting responsibility, 
and apologizing with sincerity.86 It entails restoring the dignity of the offender that was lost due to 
the shame of the arrest. Empowering and restoring a sense of security to the offender involves 
rendering employment, education, or any engagement to boost the offender's sense of success.87 
This consists of the diagnosis of the offender's lack that may have resulted in the crime.  
There is a restoration for the lack of empowerment that often leads to crime.  It is by seeking 
to meet the unmet needs of the offender’s living in one way or the other. It gives the offender a 
sense of success. In terms of social support, as it relates to the offender, it provides a sense of 
 
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid., p.56. 
84  Ibid., p.57. 
85  Ibid., p.57 
86  Ibid. This entails the offender’s  willingness to accept responsibility for the responsibility for the outcome of 
crime.  Also, apologizing to the victim for the harms caused by the offence. 
87  Ibid. 
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"shame in terms of letting loved ones down rather than a Western sense of individual guilt".88 By 
this, Braithwaite explains that including well-wishers of the offender in the process, helps make 
the offender's sense of shame be one that involves letting down loved family members and friends. 
Rather than offenders feeling the stigmatizing shame for who they are, offenders are encouraged 
to focus on what they have done and feeling shame for their actions.  Reintegrative shame 
facilitates the restoration of the offender and the reintegration of the offender into the community. 
What does it mean to restore the community?  Although for many people, a sense of 
community is undermined by many of the structural forces of modern industrial society that 
Christie described, a stronger sense of community is cultivated through restorative justice 
processes. In this way, the community is restored.  Braithwaite describes the restoration of the 
community on three different levels (the micro-, the meso-, and the macro-level).  On the micro-
level or the level of interpersonal relationships, the restorative justice process can contribute to 
stronger relationships by building social support for both victims and offenders.89  For example, a 
circle of support people was built around Sam in the story of Sam.  On a meso- level or at the level 
of social organizations, restorative justice processes can contribute to the strengthening of these 
organizations by incorporating restorative justice practices in schools, churches, professions, and 
ethnic communities.90 This entails cultivating a sense of empowerment in these organizations for 
conflict resolution.  On a macro-level or at the level of the democratic process, by cultivating 
debate about social issues and procedural justice, restorative justice processes develop what is 
needed for a healthy deliberative democracy.  Thus, although modern society may not have as 
strong a sense of community as we may like, the use of restorative justice processes can contribute 
to the strengthening of the community on different levels.  
 
1.3.2 Restorative Values Versus Retributive Values 
Braithwaite holds the view that all cultures have some deep-seated elements of restorative 
and retributive traditions.91 However, he also believes that retributive traditions are less valuable 
in the 21st century.  It is because, in the present world, "retributive emotions are more likely to get 
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us into trouble than out of it."92 He seems to be alluding here to the fact that the desire to return 
hurt for hurt, a view often associated with retributivism, contributed to more "determined violent 
cultures," and such violent cultures no longer have the value for individuals that it may have once 
had. 
He states that restorative justice values are universal and a "more valuable resource than 
retributive traditions."93 He argues that this is so because all culture value repairs, security, dignity, 
and empowerment and are based on a sense of justice and encouragement of social support.94  He 
suggests that these values have a better fit into our society today than retributivism and provide for 
a community that is less violent and more supportive of individual needs.  When he narrows down 
his list of restorative justice values to three 'core' values, his account of these core values is 
explained in terms of their opposition to elements often associated with the retributive tradition.  
Braithwaite describes the three core values of restorative justice in the following way: 
 
Healing relationships, in place of balancing hurt with hurt, is one 
of the core values of restorative justice. So is community 
deliberation: putting the problem in the center of the circle rather 
than putting the criminal at the center of the criminal justice 
system. Whatever a retributive system deems as the right 
punishment for the criminal will usually be the wrong solution to 
the problem.  Non-domination also merits consideration as a core 
value of restorative justice- ensuring that all voices in the circle 
are heard and that none are silenced by domination.95  
 
The point here is that Braithwaite presents restorative justice values in the light of its 
differences with retributive values. Restorative justice aims at healing where harm and damage 
have been done. The value of healing relationships entails that all parties involved in the conflict 
are part of the resolution. Since injustice hurts, justice should heal.96 The questions restorative 
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93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid., p.59. 
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96  Braithwaite, John (PDF).  The Fundamentals of Restorative Justice.  Sinclair Dinnen, Anita Jowitt, Tess Newton.  
Dec., 2002,  www.researchgate.net/publication/305257334_The_Fundamentals_of_Restorative_Justice.  p.35. 
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justice asks are: How can we restore the victim's losses, including a loss to security, dignity, and 
power? What can we do to assist the offender and restore dignity, empowerment, and the right 
relationships with others? How can we restore harmony and balance between victim and offender, 
as well as the offender and the community?  How can we protect security in society by preventing 
crime from happening in the first place? The restorative justice value of a healing relationship as 
opposed to the win or lose outcome that the criminal justice system portrays, with its balancing of 
hurt with hurt. The criminal justice system asks questions like: What is the best way to punish the 
offender? What does the law say when a person commits this offense? How can we protect society 
from this criminal? 
An instance would be a case where an offender convicted for robbery in a superstore arrives 
at the criminal court. The idea is usually to punish that offender and achieve the win-lose scenario. 
The offender is most cases portrayed as the loser, and the state is the winner of the case. One can 
see that any healing for the victim is an unintentional side-effect of a retributive criminal justice 
process, that is if any healing for the victim occurs at all.  
The value of community deliberation puts the offense at the center and not placing the 
offender as the central problem. Focus or blame is on the offense committed and not the offender. 
Thus, the contrast between reintegrative shaming that is part of restorative justice processes is 
made with the stigmatizing shame that is often part of Western retributivist approaches.  While 
reintegrative shame is directed towards the action and allows for the possibility of reintegration 
and reconciliation, stigmatizing shame excludes the offender with the label of criminal and 
facilitates the formation of criminal subcultures.  Thus, the value of a restorative justice approach 
that values community deliberation better provides for the possibility of reconciliation and 
reintegration of offenders into the community, more so than an approach that stigmatizes the 
offender for who he or she is.   
Braithwaite adds that families who apply restorative practices "…have less delinquent 
children than families who are punitive and stigmatizing."97 This is such that by using the method 
of reintegrative shaming, through the participation, respect, and maintenance of the child's dignity, 
the family would hardly produce children that commit crimes. I agree with this because childhood 
is the right time where children are in an active learning process, and what a child learns to value 
from childhood in terms of morals can be a foundation for a child in his developing years. The 
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child learns how to be a responsible citizen, just by learning the way people manage conflicts in 
their homes. 
 Finally, restorative justice processes express the value of freedom as non-domination; the 
circles are not to be dominated by either of the party to the offense. Here Braithwaite acknowledges 
that power, understood in terms of power relations and subordination can negatively imply upon 
restorative justice practices. The power- relations between people of different economic classes, 
racialized classes, and between people of different genders and sexual orientations can undermine 
an individual's ability to be heard within any process, including restorative justice processes. For 
instance the subordination of indigenous people in the context of  colonization and in post- colonial 
contexts make it more  difficult for individual indigenous people to be listened to and heard in any 
process.. Thus, Braithwaite argues that restorative justice processes must be organized in a way 
that is mindful of these power dynamics within a given society. However, it is organized in a way 
that "all voices in the circle are heard and that none are silenced by domination."98  Braithwaite 
also expresses respectful listening as one of the fundamental values connected to freedom as non-
domination. On his view: 
 
Human beings are storytelling animals. You can tell how much power 
a person has by observing how many people listen attentively to his or 
her stories. It follows from this that we can empower the powerless by 
institutionalizing more effective listening to their stories of injustice. 
This is what restorative justice is about: the deadly simple 
empowerment that comes from creating pacified spaces where we listen 




98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid., p.36.  Braithwaite explains the importance of effective listening in restorative meetings by all parties involved 
in a conflict.  The victim and offender tell their stories on their experience and how they felt.  It entails a dialogue 
where each party to a conflict is listened to without one of the parties dominating the meeting.  It entails respect 
for the individuals’ (victim and offender) opinion.  In this same article, Braithwaite holds that the other values of 
apology and forgiveness without any form of persuasion naturally evolves through this act of respectful listening. 
The true meaning of forgiveness and apology for Braithwaite is in the willingness of the victim involved to freely 
give it to the offender. 
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Braithwaite further acknowledges that some critics have accused restorative justice of 
aggravating the problem of social justice based on the view that "just systems tend to generate and 
result in orientalism."100 The point here is that restorative justice practice can be viewed as a way 
of homogenizing justice as it relates to a particular culture to absorb distinct cultures into one 
system of restorative justice. The concern expressed here is that restorative justice processes might 
be used to dominate indigenous people and other historically disadvantaged groups in society by 
undermining the diversity of these different groups. Braithwaite is acknowledging that the power 
dynamics within society can also impact on the use of restorative justice processes (i.e. restorative 
justice processes are not immune from the relations of domination and subordination that are part 
of a given society). However, he also believes that restorative justice proponents that are aware of 
theses power-dynamics can and should organize restorative justice processes in such a way that 
provides spaces for diversity, while at the same time promoting, valuing, and respecting the rights 
of all people involved. However, Braithwaite believes that restorative justice processes can and 
should aim at creating spaces for diversity while at the same time promoting, valuing, and 
respecting the rights of all people involved. So, there is a need for Restorative justice to create 
spaces where indigenous people and other minority groups can approve of justice matters in a way 
that makes sense to them.101  He goes on to assert that "restorative justice must be a culturally 
diverse social movement that accommodates a rich plurality of strategies in pursuit of the truths it 
holds to be universal."102 Despite the difference in cultures, one from the other, there is a ground 
of commonality they share in restorative values, which are necessarily found in all cultures.  
While Braithwaite generally believes that the values of restorative justice are a more 
valuable resource for our society than retributivist values and the Western approach to criminal 
law, he does believe that there is a need to retain some elements of punishment and retributivism 
in order to protect the rights of people in restorative processes.  He states, 
 
Unlike the most radical versions of abolitionism, restorative justice sees 
promises in preserving a state role as a watchdog of rights and concedes 
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that for a tiny fraction of the people in our prisons, it may be necessary 
to protect the community from them by incarceration.103 
 
Here, Braithwaite portrays his view on restorative justice as a midway view which does not attempt 
to replace the criminal justice system entirely with restorative practices. The idea for him is to shift 
the power of handling the conflict from the criminal justice system to the parties involved in a 
conflict, and the criminal justice system must apply checks and balances to this practice, making 
sure the power is not misused. Healing all parties to a conflict, for Braithwaite, is at the core of 
restorative justice, but the rights of all participants need to be protected in the process. 
Braithwaite concludes by acknowledging some limitations of restorative justice processes: 
 
While I am cautiously optimistic that the empirical evidence will 
continue to be encouraging about the efficacy and decency of 
restorative justice compared with retributive justice, the evidence is also 
clear that restorative justice also fails. Victims sometimes resent the 
time involved in deliberation; sometimes, they are extremely vengeful, 
though more often, I am moved by how forgiving they are when 
genuinely empowered with process control.104 
 
In this quotation, Braithwaite acknowledges the efficiency and decency of restorative justice 
practice and its superiority in both respects to retributivist approaches. However, he also explains 
that there are setbacks, and the process is not perfect. One of the problems may be the lack of 
interest from the victim to partake in the circle. In contrast, others may involve the unwillingness 
of the offender or the community to participate.  There also may be problems with participants 
accepting the core values of restorative justice, and in enforcing the agreed-upon resolution to the 
conflict.  Braithwaite is saying that when people refuse to participate or refuse to abide by 
agreements, there is no choice but to fall back on our dominant Western approach to criminal law. 
This approach involves both punishment and retributive elements. 
 
103  Ibid., p.60. 
104  Ibid., p.63. Braithwaite points out that restorative justice does not work out in all cases.  There are constraints in 




1.4 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Braithwaite's Version 
Braithwaite's argument on restorative justice is thoughtful and articulate. For the most part, 
it is a comprehensive explanation of restorative justice. Braithwaite's restorative justice view is a 
more moderate approach to restorative justice than Christie's approach. The reason is that 
Braithwaite, unlike Christie, does not rule out a role for the Western criminal legal system in issues 
that involve crime. Braithwaite still acknowledges the importance of the Western legal system and 
holds the view that the criminal legal system and restorative justice are effective when applied in 
conjunction with each other. Both can act as a check on the excesses and deficiencies of the other. 
For instance, in a case where an offender refuses to carry out his part of an agreement in restorative 
justice practice, such a case can be forwarded to the criminal justice system. Also, the addressing 
of severe cases like murder should take place in the criminal court where the rights of the accused 
can be better protected. I would argue that Braithwaite's view is more realistic and adequate 
because neither restorative justice nor a purely retributivist Western legal system would progress 
adequately by itself. There is a need for balance in the criminal justice system.  
While Christie advocates a more communitarian society and sees restorative justice as a 
panacea for problems with society and the Western legal system, Braithwaite presents a more 
moderate expectation for restorative justice and a more positive picture of modern industrial 
society.  Braithwaite would acknowledge that many of the changes that Christie has described have 
happened in Western industrial society (for instance, Braithwaite would not deny that society has 
become more fragmented and depersonalized, undermining our sense of community).  Braithwaite 
also believes that the restorative justice process has the possibility of restoring community in the 
sense of strengthening relationships on an interpersonal level, at the level of churches, schools, 
and other organizations and at the state level by cultivating deliberative democracy. But restorative 
justice processes cannot overcome the structural elements that define the modern industrial society.  
Further, Braithwaite sees the good of individualism and protecting individual rights and freedoms 
in our society.  Thus, Braithwaite states that "...we can aspire to a society that is strong on rights 
and strong on responsibilities, that nurtures strong community and strong individuals.”105 
 
105  Ibid., p.63.  Braithwaite acknowledges the issues involved in communitarianism and individualism.  His point is 
that there should be a balance between the two such that, they learn from each other’s as the success of an individual 




Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice is also preferable to Christie's because he 
acknowledges that the consent of the offender is essential in terms of choosing to partake in 
restorative justice circles. It follows that for Braithwaite, voluntary participation is a crucial feature 
of restorative justice practice as it brings about the genuinely successful progress of the meeting. 
Obtaining the consent of the offender is a sign of respect for their dignity, whether he wants to 
participate or not. The same applies to the victim. Equal opportunity for participation is presented 
to both victim and offender. However, there are some shortcomings in Braithwaite's theory, 
shortcomings that need to be overcome.  For instance, in Braithwaite's example, he provides the 
following account of the restoration of Sam; he explains: 
 
When the conference reconvenes, Sam's sister speaks to him with love 
and strength. Looking straight into his eyes, the first gaze he could not 
avoid in the conference, she says that she knows exactly what he has 
been through with their parents. No details are spoken. But the victim 
seems to understand what is spoken of by the knowing communication 
between sister and brother. Tears rushing down the old woman's cheeks 
and over a trembling mouth. It is his sister's love that penetrates Sam's 
callous exterior. From then on, he is emotionally engaged with the 
conference.”106 
 
My point here is that Braithwaite makes it seem like emotion implies manipulation in 
restorative justice practice. It makes it seem like Sam's sister's action of speaking to him with love 
and strength was what made him commit to taking responsibility for his actions. Also, it makes it 
seem like the emotional responses between sister and brother caused the victim to develop 
compassion for Sam. That particular emotional moment appears to have resulted in the supposed 
success of the conference because “from then on, he is emotionally engaged with the 
conference.”107 Are we saying that restorative justice totally relies on the emotional compliance of 
 
individual rights and needs suppressed under the concept of community.  At the same time, there is competitive 
individualism which can be checked by communitarianism for excesses.  It is this idea of check and balances in 
the social system that he applies as well in terms of tolerating some aspects of the traditional criminal legal system 
with its punishment. 
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the offender or victim in other for it to be practicable? My view is that, although restorative justice 
practice is not devoid of our emotions, people can act based on their reasoning as well. I believe 
that essentially, there is an overlap between emotions and reason. In Chapter Three, I will appeal 
to some Kantian notions in order to explain this overlap between emotions and reason.  Although 
Kant is known for providing a clear divide between reason and emotion when characterizing the 
nature of our moral duty, he also acknowledges that some emotions can help us in performing our 
moral duty, while other emotions can hinder us in performing our moral duty.  In this way, 
Kantians can argue that it is important to cultivate our emotions to enable us to better perform our 
moral duty.  When we cultivate our emotions in a way that helps us to perform our rational duty, 
emotions "overlap" with reason.  In this way, restorative justice processes can be and should be 
directed to the cultivation of both our emotions and our reasoning.  The story of Sam makes it 
seem as if Sam is only moved by emotions and the manipulation of any emotions will 
do.  However, I believe that restorative justice processes should be directed to the cultivation of 
those emotions that aid reason in performing our moral duty. 
Emotions are part of human life, and restorative justice is no exception. Even in criminal 
law, there are cases where judges appeal to emotions and respond emotionally to testimony before 
them (and no doubt juries do as well).  Our Western legal courts are not devoid of emotion, and 
restorative justice processes will have emotional elements as well.  However, emotional influence 
should not be placed at the forefront of either restorative justice practice or Western legal systems.  
Further, restorative justice should not be characterized as a mere appeal to emotion, while 
contrasted with Western retributive approaches that supposedly represent a mere appeal to 
impartial reason.  These are mischaracterizations of both approaches.  The story of Sam that 
Braithwaite presents is misleading since it makes it seem as if the appeal in restorative justice is 
merely a matter of emotional coercion and that the appeal to emotion is unproblematic.  Appeal to 
mere emotion is a problem since it seems to manipulate and coerce people.  This is one of the 
criticisms made by people like Acorn and Geereats, a criticism that gains some credence due to 
this problematic story of Sam given by Braithwaite.  
Finally, although restorative justice is explained in terms of its opposition to retributivism 
and its punitive approach, Braithwaite never specifies what he means by retributivism.  As a result, 
it is not clear in what sense restorative justice is opposed to retributivism and in what sense they 
can act as checks on each other. In a related matter, there is also no clarification of restorative 
34 
 
justice's opposition to the concept of punishment. Is restorative justice as opposed to punishment 
per se?  Can restorative justice processes end with the "agreement" that the offender ought to be 
punished?  Braithwaite does not clarify what he means by punishment and whether or not 
restorative justice processes in focusing upon healing must be opposed to punitive resolutions.  
Braithwaite just explains that proportionality in the criminal justice system is not applied in the 
same way when it involves punishing rich and poor offenders. Also that "restorative justice, we 
contend, has a better chance for being made equitably available to rich and poor than just 
desserts.”108 I will deal with these weaknesses in the next two chapters that follow. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explained the views of Christie and Braithwaite on restorative justice, 
and I have shown how Braithwaite's version is less extreme and more plausible than Christie’s 
approach. I have explained Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice in terms of his notions of 
reintegrative shame, the story of Sam, his account of restoring victims, offenders and the 
community, and his account of the core values of restorative justice (healing, voluntary 
participation, active listening, nondomination, and problem centeredness).   Braithwaite believes 
that a process that respects these core values of restorative justice naturally sets the stage for 
apology and forgiveness to take place. Braithwaite's unintended appeal to and reliance on emotions 
in his fable on Sam present problems for his version of restorative justice. Additionally, 
Braithwaite does not adequately explain what he means by retributive justice, and its values, and 
thus restorative justice’s opposition to retributive justice is unclear.  Finally, since his concept of 
punishment is also not explained, it is not clear how restorative justice stands in relation to 
punishment.  
The next two chapters aim at overcoming these deficiencies in Braithwaite’s argument to 
defend restorative justice.  In the next chapter, I will appeal to the influential work of Hart to 
provide some distinctions to clarify the meaning of punishment and retributivism.  With these 
distinctions in mind, it will become clearer in what senses restorative justice is opposed to 
retributivism and punishment, and how elements of both could be part of the same legal system.  
 
108  Ibid., p.61. There is no outright definition of punishment or its relevance to restorative justice (at least Braithwaite’s 
view).  Although Braithwaite’s moderate version of restorative justice by acknowledging the role of the criminal 




In the final chapter of this thesis, I will turn to examining criticisms by Acorn and Geeraets, 
objections that relate to the role of emotions in the restorative justice process.  I will argue that 
with some Kantian modifications to Braithwaite’s notions of dignity and freedom, a more plausible 
version of restorative justice will result, one that can respond adequately to these criticisms by 





IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS TO CLARIFY BETWEEN 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND ITS OPPOSITION TO 
RETRIBUTIVISM 
 
2.0  Introduction 
H.L.A. Hart’s book Punishment and Responsibility:  Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 
originally published in 1968, has been very influential for legal theorists dealing with philosophical 
topics in the area of criminal law and punishment.  In this book, he makes a number of distinctions 
that many philosophers in this area now take for granted.  For instance, he distinguishes questions 
concerning the definition of punishment from questions concerning its justification.  He also 
distinguishes questions concerning the general justifying aim of punishment versus questions 
concerning its distributions (who should be punished and the amount).  In the first chapter of his 
book, Hart distinguishes two kinds of retributivism based on these distinctions.  He distinguishes 
“Retributivism as a General Justifying Aim” from retributivism in distribution of punishment.  
This distinction, Hart believes, is important for anyone understanding retributivism.  However, 
when he finished writing this book, Hart found that his account of retributivism was not sufficient, 
and  he needed to write a postscript on retributivism for the book.  Thus, in this postscript, Hart 
begins by stating,  
 
In the first of these essays, I made some attempts to clarify the idea of retribution 
by distinguishing what I there called Retribution as a General Justifying Aim from 
retribution in the distribution of punishment.  But it is plain enough that I have not 
done justice to the variety and complexity of this notion, and some rather 
unrewarding disputes about the morality of punishment continue to flourish, in part 
at least because some of its ambiguities are still undetected.  So in an effort to bring 
them to light, I shall explore here some further reaches of the subject.109 
 
109  Hart, H.L.A., and John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law.  Oxford 




Thus, in addition to distinguishing retribution as a general justifying aim and retribution in 
distribution of punishment, Hart in this postscript will introduce a ‘crude’ version of retributivism 
and describe its elements.  Although academics rarely defend this crude version, it is a view 
common among people, and elements of this crude version may be a part of actual legal systems. 
Hart then introduces three modifications to this crude version of retributivism, /*/modifications 
that aim at overcoming weaknesses in the crude version.  Thus, the modified version of 
retributivism more accurately represents more contemporary versions of retributivism that 
academics find more defensible.   
 My goal in this chapter is not to critically evaluate all versions of retributivism, but to 
explain in what sense Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice is opposed to retributivism and 
how it may acknowledge and even incorporate some elements of retributivism.  I will also appeal 
to Hart’s distinction between defining punishment and justifying punishment to show how this 
distinction is problematic since definitions of punishment can and often do incorporate moral 
values and even retributivist elements.  As a result, I will argue that whether restorative justice 
processes are opposed to punishment, depends on how punishment is construed. 
 In the first section (2.1), I will explain some of Hart’s key distinctions and its implications 
for understanding retributivism.  I will also provide an analysis of his distinction between defining 
punishment and justifying it.  In the second section (2.2), I will explain his distinction between 
crude retributivism and a modified version of retributivism.  In the third and final section of this 
chapter (2.3), I will apply Hart’s account of the different versions of retributivism to Braithwaite’s 
account of restorative justice. 
 
2.1  Hart's Main Distinctions and their Implications for Understanding 
Retributivism 
The concept of punishment is central to the philosophy of law. Theorists raise questions 
about the efficacy and justification of punishment. Some of these questions are:  Is punishment 
unjust? What could justify the infliction of punishment on people? The pursuit of answers to these 
questions among theories of legal punishment has led to differences in views. H.L.A. Hart, in his 
book Punishment and Responsibility, attempts to provide a framework to answer the previously 
stated questions. He introduced three questions: “Questions of definition, general justifying aim, 
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and distribution.”110 The question of distribution is divided into questions of the amount and issues 
of who the law should punish. 
The question of defining punishment is the first question Hart presents. Hart explains that 
the question of the definition must be separated from that of the general justifying aim in  order to 
avoid confusion.111  Hart presents this question of definition more like a road map to enable him 
identify what it is that needs to be justified.  Hart points out that the standard cases of punishment 
entail offenses committed against legal rules, while the substandard cases involve punishment for 
breach of non-legal rules. For instance, a man that murders, for Hart, would categorize as a 
standard case, and a child who steals his father's box filled with money and is asked to stay away 
from visiting friends for a month is a substandard case of punishment. Hart explains: "I shall define 
the standard or central case of punishment in terms of five elements: 
 
1. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. 
2. It must be an offense against legal rules. 
3. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense. 
4. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.  
5. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against 
which the offense is committed.112 
 
Standard cases of punishment mainly entail the intentional administration of pain to an offender; 
it involves an act against legal orders like the case of manslaughter. Punishment has to be 
administered by a legal institution not to any other person but the actual or supposed offender for 
an offense committed by a legal institution. For instance, consider the case where a judge sentences 
a woman who pleads guilty and is convicted for killing her husband to 20 years imprisonment with 
hard labor. Here we have the standard case of punishment because the punishment entails pain, it 
is intentional, and it is administered to the actual offender by legal personnel, the judge. 
Hart also explains that there are secondary or nonstandard cases of punishment. For him, 
they include but are not restricted to the following cases.  A nonstandard case would be 
punishments for breaches of legal rules imposed or administered otherwise than by officials 
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(decentralized sanctions). Another nonstandard example would be punishment for breaches of 
non-legal rules or orders (punishment in a family or school). Vicarious or collective punishment 
of some members of a social group for actions done by others without the former's authorization, 
encouragement, control, or permission is also a nonstandard case. Finally, Hart provides the case 
of punishment of persons (otherwise than under (c)) who neither are in fact nor supposed to be 
offenders as a nonstandard case of punishment.113 
Hart well understood that, aside from the standard case of punishment, there are other cases 
of punishment that do not have all the features of the standard or central case. The instances of 
substandard punishment, for Hart, occur mostly in social groups due to breaches of rules that are 
not necessarily legal and do not require the involvement of judicial bodies. These are found in 
families, schools, social groups, and schools.114 In substandard cases, unlike the standard cases, 
punishment may apply to a group of people in a particular group, even if every other person except 
one person is innocent. In other words, punishment may apply to persons other than the offender. 
To exemplify, consider the substandard case of theft involving a member of a basketball team 
where the actual offender is unknown, the whole team gets punished for one member's 
wrongdoing. 
Hart distinguishes a standard case of punishment from substandard cases to prevent what 
he calls the “definitional stop.”115 According to Hart, if one simply stipulates a definition and 
asserts that this is the “essence” of punishment, then this might rule out consideration of the 
justifiability of substandard cases without any argument (since they would not be, strictly speaking, 
“punishment” by definition).  For example, Duff provides a definition of punishment that can be 
in danger of this definitional stop.  He argues that legal punishment involves the “…the intentional 
imposition of something that is intended to be both burdensome and reprobative on a supposed 
offender for a supposed crime by a person or authority who has the power to do so.”116 Duff also 
adds that punishment deprives people of things they value and do things that they would not do 
voluntarily. The definition comes off as simple, but yet ambiguous as he does not fully explain 
what punishment means by defining the terms “reprobative” and “burden”. Terms like 
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‘reprobation’ are especially problematic since it seems to bring in elements associated with a 
retributivist justification of punishment, like the expression of moral condemnation that is a part 
of modified versions of retributivism (as we will see in section 2.2).   
Since Duff’s definition does not also acknowledge substandard cases of punishment, his 
definition might also entail a “definitional stop.”117 It represents a definitional limit that prevents 
us from considering other kinds of punishments that might be justifiable in a criminal law context.  
Hart says, “it prevents us from investigating the rational and moral status of a system of 
punishment.”118   For example, Duff’s definition of punishment stipulates that punishment must 
be imposed on supposed offenders for a supposed crime. It fails to consider whether vicarious 
punishments are punishments and whether vicarious punishments are justifiable.  Further, Duff’s 
definition focuses on punishments intended to be both burdensome and reprobative, so this raises 
questions about “punishments” not intended to be reprobative, but rehabilitative.  Such a 
substandard case of punishment is ruled out from consideration by definition.  Hart’s account of 
punishment in terms of standard and substandard cases allows him to have the flexibility of 
considering nonstandard cases and their justifiability within a system of criminal law. 
The second distinction Hart makes as part of his framework is to distinguish questions 
concerning the general justifying aim of a system of punishment from the justification of 
distributions of punishment.  He applies this distinction to the notion of retributivism explicitly.  
Hart argues: 
Here I shall merely insist that it is one thing to use the word Retribution 
at this point in an account of the principle of punishment to designate 
the General Justifying Aim of the system, and quite another to use it to 
secure that to the question ‘To whom may punishment be applied?119  
 
The point in the above quotation is that, for Hart, the question of general justifying aim, 
which is more like a question of the purpose for the entire system of punishment differs from the 
questions of who should receive punishment and how much punishment a particular offender 
receives. The main difference is that the general justifying aim tends to justify the system of 
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punishment as a whole. The general justifying purpose will focus on the effects or consequences 
of a system of punishment if one is a consequentialist. The forward-looking theory or 
consequentialist theory, for Hart, holds the view that “its beneficial consequences justify the 
practice of a system of punishment.”120 Thus, consequentialists will point to the main 
consequentialist aims of a system of punishment (like deterrence, reducing crime, or protecting the 
public). However, the general justifying aim of the system for a retributivist cannot be found in 
the consequences or results of a system of punishment (or cannot be found in that alone).  Thus, 
retributivists must explain some intrinsic value in a system of punishment (whether in terms of 
some intrinsic moral good in meting out punishments for offenses or some intrinsic good in 
expressing moral condemnations through this system of punishments).   
Whether one accepts a consequentialist account of the general justifying aim or a 
retributivist explanation of the general justifying aim, the question of who should be punished and 
how much is a separate question.  Questions of distribution can be determined independently of 
the general justifying aim and provide limits on how the system of punishment may pursue its 
general aims.  Hart explains that for the retributivist, “the main justification of the practice lies in 
the fact that when a breach of the law involves moral guilt, the application to the offender of the 
pain of punishment is itself a thing of value.”121 The point here is that, for the retributivists, the 
question of distribution (i.e., who should be punished) is determined by appeal to the moral desert 
of the offender.  Thus, the act of punishment is justifiable for a person because the person deserves 
the punishment that ‘fits’ the crime. A retributivist will justify this act of punishment by stating 
that to commit a crime implies that the punishment is morally deserved. This is what Hart calls the 
“backward-looking approach.”122 
Consequentialists can also hold that the pursuit of the general justifying aim of the system 
of punishment can and should be limited to punishing only offenders for crimes.  However, they 
will argue that this qualification on the pursuit of the general aims in the system is justified for 
independent consequentialist reasons.  In other words, it is a mistake to think that just because one 
is a consequentialist with respect to the general justifying aim, this means that consequentialists 
cannot restrict punishments to offenders for offenses (a question of distribution).  Further, it is a 
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mistake to think that because one is a retributivist regarding distribution, this must commit one to 
retributivism as a general justifying aim.  The question of general justifying aim is distinct from 
questions of distribution.  Thus Hart maintains that:  
 
Much confusing shadow fighting between utilitarians and their 
opponents may be avoided if it is recognized that it is perfectly 
consistent to assert both that the general justifying aim of the practice 
of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this 
general aim should be qualified or restricted out of the deference to 
principles of distribution which require that punishment should be only 
of an offender for an offense.123 
 
Hart’s view is that the consequentialist view of punishment serves as a better justificatory aim for 
a system of punishment than retributivism. He believes that the appeal to retribution or even 
reprobation as the general justifying aim of the system of punishment either avoids “…the question 
of justification altogether or are in spite of their protestations disguised forms of Utilitarianism”.124 
He will reiterate this point in his postscript when he notes the appeal to retributivism as a general 
justifying aim “…appears to be a mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of 
the two evils of moral wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good” or such an appeal 
represents “…an abandonment of any serious attempt to provide a moral justification for 
punishment”.125 Thus, Hart believes that the general justifying aim of a system of punishment is 
more plausibly understood in consequentialist terms (for example, that it fosters public good for 
the offender and society, avoiding reoffence and protecting the community). But this question is 
independent of questions of distribution (i.e.  the question of who should receive punishment and 
to what extent) and this must always be kept in mind. 
I would argue that although Hart’s distinction between retributivism as a general justifying 
aim for the system versus retributivism in distribution is a crucial distinction to keep in mind when 
characterizing retributivism, I would also argue that his opening distinction between the definition 
of punishment and its justification is not as straightforward as Hart suggests. I would agree with 
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McPherson who argues that the definition and justification of punishment are hard to keep apart.126 
The questions; “what is punishment?” and “why do we punish?” are questions that could separate 
without any “logical priority of the first over the second.”127 The term punishment is a word that 
entails value.128 It is because to ask whether punishment can be justified is to ask if it is the best 
way of achieving an end or whether it has a purpose.  
Distinguishing defining punishment from its justification equals separating the fact of a 
thing from its value. For instance, to say Canada is one of the coldest countries in the world is a 
fact. Giving reasons why we say Canada is one of the coldest countries in the world are questions 
of justification. However, a total value-neutral account or a distinction of the definition of 
punishment from its justification would not provide an adequate account of what punishment 
entails.129  For example, with Duff’s definition of punishment, he incorporated the notion of 
“reprobation” into his definition of punishment.  It is difficult to see how incorporating the notion 
of condemnation or reprobation could be value-neutral.  And even with Hart’s definition of 
punishment, by restricting the standard case to supposed offenders for supposed crimes, he is 
already introducing a retributive element, that only offenders deserve punishment, into the 
definition of punishment itself.  Thus, it is difficult to provide a definition of punishment that is 
not inherently retributive, at least in some senses of the word retributive. 
Although Hart’s main distinction between retributivism as a general justifying aim and 
retributivism in distribution is sound, Hart acknowledges that this does not take into account the 
varieties of retributivism. Thus, in the next section, I will example Hart’s postscript and his 
distinction between crude versions of retributivism and the modified version, before turning 
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  2.2  Hart's Distinction Between Crude Retributivism and Modified 
Retributivism 
In the Postscript, Hart states, “it is I think helpful to start with a simple, indeed crude, model 
of a retributive theory which would satisfy this stricter usage”130.  Hart begins by providing an 
account of a crude version of retributivism and then builds upon this crude version a more plausible 
version of retributivism (which he describes as “modifications of the model”).  The retributivist's 
view in its crude form, for Hart, asserts three things.131 
 
First that a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily done 
something morally wrong; secondly, that his punishment must in some way match, 
or be the equivalent of, the wickedness of the offense; and thirdly, that the 
justification for punishing men under such condition is that the return of suffering 
for moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good.132  
   
The point here is that for this crude version, an offender must be punished if he has done something 
wrong out of his own choice and willingness devoid of any form of external influence. According 
to Hart, this involves an answer to the question, what sort of conduct may be punished?  Moreover, 
the gravity of an offender's crime must, in some sense, match or be equal to the gravity of 
punishment given to the offender. This involves an answer to the question: How severely should 
a person be punished?  Finally, the act of punishing a person who goes against the law is morally 
justifiable in itself, and not with reference to some results of consequence. It is more like what I 
will call an input-output transaction (offense =punishment).  For Hart, this involves an answer to 
the question, “what is the justification for the punishment?”133 
An example of a crude version of retributivism is the old testament passage of an eye 
concerning an eye. The bible makes attempts to answer the three questions: What sort of conduct 
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may be punished? How severely? And what is the justification for the punishment? To answer the 
first question. It is explained in the bible. 
 
Therefore, whoever resists the authorities resists what God has 
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are 
not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of 
the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will 
receive his approval, for he is God's servant for your good. But if 
you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For 
he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath.134 
 
According to the above quotation, anyone who disobeys the authority is liable to punishment. It 
explains that the duty of the ruler is to correct bad conduct and punish offenders unsparingly. To 
answer the question of amount and justifying aim, it is written: 
 
Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth 
for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but 
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other 
also.135 
 
Futhermore, in Leviticus 24:17-20: 
 
Anyone who takes the life of a human being is to be put to death. 
Anyone who takes the life of someone's animal must make restitution 
for life. Anyone who injures the neighbor is to be injured in the same 
manner: fracture for fracture, eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. The one 
who has inflicted the injury must suffer the same injury. 
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‘An eye for an eye’ is the view that a person who has hurt another should be punished to a 
similar degree.136Another example of a crude version of retributivism is a way of interpreting 
Kant’s account in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant holds the view that 
offenders are punished not for any consequence, such as deterring future crimes or to reform the 
criminal, but rather for the sake of punishing because punishment is right in itself. It is attained 
from Kant's view that anyone who does that which is wrong deserves to suffer.137 Interestingly, 
Kant holds the view that punishing those who break the law would count as a moral act.  
 
Kant also argues that: 
This fitting of punishment to the crime, which can occur only by a 
judge imposing the death sentence in accordance with the strict law 
of retribution, is shown by the fact that only by this is a sentence of 
death pronounced on every criminal in proportion to his inner 
wickedness (even when the crime is not murder but another crime 
against the state that can be paid for only by death).138  
 
Here Kant explicitly states that when considering the appropriate amount of punishment to 
give an offender, taking into account the inner intention of the offenders is an essential step to 
show that justice is done. For instance, if a man is convicted for arson, Kant would suggest that 
the punishment should, in some sense, match the crime committed and that the intention of the 
criminal who committed this act should also be taken into account when deciding the type of 
punishment that suits the crime. If the offender's act is found to be intentional, the more it attracts 
grave punishment. 
For Hart, “The simple equivalencies of an eye for an eye or a death for death seem either 
repugnant or inapplicable to most offenses, and even if a refined version of equivalence in 
demanding a degree of suffering equivalent to the degree of the offender’s wickedness is 
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intelligible, there seems to be no way of determining these degrees.”139  Hart’s point here is that 
the crude version of revenge is mostly inapplicable and inefficient to offenses. If, for instance, the 
punishment for damaging a person's eye is to treat the offender the same way, then more harm will 
be caused than good in the society and consequently lead to further ills in society. Also, that there 
is no way of deciding or measuring the gravity of an offense concerning punishment for particular 
crimes, this is because offenses differ on a case by case basis and there are different factors to 
consider like the mental capacity, physical capacity, and the intention of the supposed offender. 
Since there are some clear problems with the crude version of retributivism, Hart argues 
that contemporary versions of retributivism typically involve three kinds of modifications or 
changes to the crude version. 
First, Hart explains that modern retributivism represents a shift towards proportionality.  
Thus, modern versions of retributivism explain how punishments should ‘match’ the crime, not in 
terms of a simple equivalence between kinds of acts (like a literal taking of an eye for taking of an 
eye) or amounts of suffering (providing the same suffering in punishment that what caused by the 
offense), but in terms of proportionality between punishment and moral gravity of the offense.  In 
other words, he describes the first modification in the following way; “punishment proportionate 
to the gravity of the offense”. 140  Although Hart believes that determining the moral gravity of 
different kinds of offenses is far from simple, he already discussed some of the difficulties and 
complexities involved in proportionality in earlier essays in the book (see essay 5 and 7 in 
particular).   He adds in the postscript that the moral gravity of a crime is not just determined by 
the subjective wickedness or the person or intention, but also by the harm done by the action to 
deal with these two disparate elements (subjective intention and harm done by action) into a 
determination of the “gravity” of the crime complicates the matter even further. 
I agree that there are difficulties in providing an adequate account of the proportion 
between punishment and gravity of offenses. Some problems with this view on proportionate 
retribution are: How do we measure this proportion? Is it bound to change over time? If yes, can 
it be enforced as law without being subject to constant change? Is it fair to give a person who 
murders out of negligence a severer punishment than one who intentionally breaks the leg of 
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another? Again, are all criminal justice institutions justified in their procedures for meting out 
punishment? Are they free and fair? These are unanswered questions that need answers.  
The first point to note is that, due to the nature of some offenses, it might be challenging 
to apportion punishment that depends on the gravity of harms caused and the subjective 
wickedness of the person. The reason is that some crimes are intentional, while others take place 
unintentionally and even non-voluntarily.  It is also the case that some unintentional actions have 
devastating consequences, while some intention acts (like attempted murder) may not produce any 
harmful consequences. There are also cases where offenders deceive the judge and claim to have 
certain excusing conditions concerning an offense with a high level of harm like murder. How can 
a judge discern when a deceitful offender claims that his violent action that resulted in his child 
going blind is as a result of schizophrenia? In this case, the offender may receive less punishment 
than usual. In the case of another offender who is honest about the same crime (blinding his child) 
and is mentally stable, he will attract a more severe punishment than the deceptive individual.  So 
even if we assume that only harm of the offense determines the gravity of the offense, things are 
complicated.  But if we also add subjective wickedness of the person or intention as a part of the 
“gravity” of the offense, the calculation of a proportionate punishment becomes even more 
arbitrary.   
It is important to note that, according to Hart, the issue of proportionality is an issue of 
distribution and, thus, concerns justifications for amounts of punishment for given offenses.  As 
such, one can believe in a retributivist justification for proportionate punishments and still be a 
consequentialist in terms of the general justifying aim of the system of punishment.  Further, Hart 
believes that one can provide a consequentialist justification for some forms of proportionality in 
distribution.  In other words, one need not be a retributivist to accept that punishments must be 
proportionate to the offense, in some sense of the word.  But generally, any justifications of 
proportionality (whether consequentialist or retributivist in nature) concern matters of distribution. 
The second modification on crude retributivism concerns retribution considered as a 
general justifying aim for the system. Here there is a shift from crude versions account of the 
general justifying aim for the system of punishment (an account that some criticize for being the 
“mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of wickedness and 
suffering are transmuted into good”) to an emphasis on public expressions of moral condemnation. 




Modern retributive theory has shifted the emphasis, from the alleged 
justice or intrinsic goodness of the return of suffering for moral evil 
done to the value of the authoritative expression, in the form of 
punishment, of moral condemnation for the moral wickedness involved 
in an offense.141 
 
Here the public expression of condemnation or reprobation is part of the justification of a system 
of punishments, whether or not it makes sense to define punishment in terms of an expression of 
reprobation (as Duff did, see section 2.1) However, more to the point, Hart argues that sometimes 
the public expression of condemnation is represented as something valuable in itself for the system 
of punishment. In contrast, other contemporary retributivists have represented this public 
expression of reprobation as tending towards certain results (i.e., a powerful deterrent, for 
example).  Thus he writes: 
 
The public expression of condemning the offender may be conceived 
as something valuable in itself; in the other, it is valuable only because 
it tends to certain valuable results, such as the voluntary reform of the 
offender, his recognition of his moral error or the maintenance, 
reinforcement or ‘vindication’ of the morality of the society against 
which the person punished has offended.142 
 
Hart finds the former case irrelevant to the practical purposes of systems of punishment, while the 
later “trembles on the margin of a Utilitarian theory.”143  Clearly, Hart is questioning whether this 
modification on retributivism can maintain its retributivism while also providing adequate 
justification for the system of punishment as a whole. 
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 The third and final modification on crude versions of retributivism is the fact that “…most 
contemporary forms of retributive theory recognize that any theory of punishment purporting to 
be relevant to a modern system of criminal law must allot an important place to the Utilitarian 
conception…”144  Hart explains that for contemporary retributivism to avoid abstraction and be 
relevant to modern systems of criminal law there has been a shift towards allowing space for 
utilitarian considerations.  Thus, some contemporary proponents of retributivism restrict the scope 
for retributivist justifications of punishment to that area of criminal law that overlaps most with 
moral wrongs.  In this way, contemporary retributivists can allow for utilitarian considerations in 
other areas (areas that relate to social and economic policy, for example).  Similarly, other 
contemporary retributivists soften their assertion that offenders must be punished (and must 
receive a punishment proportionate to the offense) to say that offenders may be punished 
proportionately (i.e., that retributivism merely asserts that the state is permitted in punishing 
offenders proportionately).  
Thus, in terms of questions that involve the severity of punishment, Hart explains that 
modern retributivists treat the “appropriateness to the crime as setting a maximum within which 
penalties, judged most likely to prevent the repetition of the crime by the offender or others, are to 
be chosen.”145 Here the requirements of retributivism become mere upper limits on what is 
allowed; consequentialist considerations are needed to help determine what should be done within 
these limits.  In all these ways, retributivism limits its scope and softens its stance in order to allow 
for the commonsense consequentialist considerations that often are a part of a judge’s deliberations 
in sentencing offenders. 
 
2.3 Applying Hart’s Distinction to Clarify Braithwaite’s Version of Restorative 
Justice and its Opposition to Retributivism 
Hart’s distinctions are essential when we consider what restorative justice is opposed to, 
and in what sense restorative justice is opposed to retributivism. Correctional Services of Canada 
website explains restorative justice as a “non-adversarial, non-retributive approach to justice.”146 
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Braithwaite indeed represents restorative justice as opposed to retributivism. However, for 
Braithwaite, both approaches are entailed in all cultures. One then asks the question: In what sense 
is restorative justice opposed to “retributivism”?   
First, it is essential to note that this question depends on what is meant by 
retributivism.  Hart, for example, gives us a distinction between a crude version of retributivism 
and a modified one, which I have explained in the previous chapter. The crude version is expressed 
in the biblical refrain of an “eye for an eye” or some version of an equal amount of suffering for 
suffering caused.  The modified version introduces proportionality, among other things, into the 
picture. It also brings in mixed elements (backward and forward-looking elements), as well as 
elements that are a part of a communicative theory/expressive theory of punishment (i.e., 
emphasizing the importance of public expressions of moral condemnation and moral 
reprobation).  Thus, when Braithwaite describes “where criminals want to hurt victims again and 
victim want to hurt criminals back; hurt endlessly begets more hurt.”147 He is, no doubt, describing 
our present propensity to institutionalize crude retributivism.  Many restorative justice proponents, 
including Braithwaite, when they express their opposition to retributivism, object to crude 
retributivism.   
But Braithwaite also objects to retributivism as a general justifying aim of a criminal legal 
system of punishment (crude retributivism or proportionate retributivism).  He would no doubt 
agree with Hart that retribution as a general justifying aim of the whole system amounts to a 
“mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of moral wickedness 
and suffering are transmuted into good.”148   
In cases that involve punishment of the offender, the question can be asked: Is 
Braithwaite’s restorative justice as opposed to punishment per se? The point is that restorative 
justice itself does not see its agreed-upon remedies as punishments (they are conceived as remedies 
or redress). In answering the question of distribution, Braithwaite is not objecting to retributivism 
as a question of “who” should be punished (only the offender deserves punishment for what the 
offender has done). However, He does believe that if punishment is warranted, then it should be 
only given for an offense and that it should not be disproportionate to the offense. In terms of the 
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amount of punishment given, Hart, in his modified view, holds that the greater the hurt caused by 
crime, the higher the punishment.149 In the same vein, Braithwaite’s account tolerates some aspects 
of the traditional criminal legal system with its sanctions, in the cases where the crime committed 
is severe as the case of murder. It also sees a vital role in protecting individual rights and the 
application of punishment through the criminal justice as providing a remedy when restorative 
justice does not work.  It is exemplified in cases when the victim or the offender chooses not to 
participate. It is also shown in cases where the offender later decides not to abide by the agreements 
made during the restorative justice process.  So, in this sense, Braithwaite would accept some 
proportionate retributivism as justified as a way of dealing with the limitations of restorative justice 
approaches. 
Braithwaite proposes a middle way between the two extremes of radicalism in his 
restorative justice theory. There is a similarity between both Hart and Braithwaite in terms of 
acknowledging the interdependence that exists between the criminal justice system and other 
justice systems like restorative justice. This is exemplified in their emphasis on deterrence, a 
forward-looking approach to crime that aims to prevent the reoccurrence of crime. It also aims to 
protect society from the effects of the crime.150 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how there are different accounts of retributivism, which 
depends on the question retributivism seeks to answer.   Retributivism that seeks to justify the 
system of punishment is significantly different and independent from retributivism in distribution.  
Further, the crude “eye for an eye” retributivism of the old testament is very different from 
contemporary versions of retributivism that seek to overcome some of the weaknesses in the crude 
version.  By distinguishing these different kinds of retributivism, it is clear that explaining how 
restorative justice stands in relation to retributivism is complicated.  With these distinctions from 
Hart, I hope that I have made some headway in clarifying how Braithwaite’s version of restorative 
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For Hart in “punishment and responsibility”, the question whether a person should be punished is a question to be 
answered in relation to the effects which punishment is likely to have on the offender and that in modern retributivism 
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deterrence involves healing of all the parties involved in a conflict. By restoring the security, by providing 
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justice is opposed to some versions (like the crude version of retributivism), but not opposed to 
the use of proportionate retributivism as a check on the deficiencies of restorative justice processes.  
However, we still need to consider the criticisms of restorative justice by people like Acorn and 
Geeraets.  By considering and responding to these criticisms, I intend to defend a modified version 
of Braithwaite’s restorative justice theory, a version that incorporates some Kantian notions of 
























DEFENDING BRAITHWAITE'S VERSION OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AGAINST THE STRONGEST OBJECTIONS BY 
ACORN AND GEERAETS 
 
3.0  Introduction 
Vincent Geeraets, in his article, “Fictions of restorative justice” and Annalise Acorn, in her 
book Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice, expressed their criticisms of 
restorative justice theories. There are some similarities in how they view restorative justice and 
what they find problematic in accounts of restorative justice processes.  No doubt, Braithwaite’s 
story of Sam, as well as other accounts of restorative justice practice by people like Christie, 
becomes a focus for criticizing restorative justice.  One similarity that they share in their opinions 
on restorative justice is their view that restorative justice practice is dominated by an emotional 
appeal (compulsory compassion and emotional manipulation).  They also share the view that 
restorative justice is not based on the active or voluntary participation of the parties. Finally, both 
believe that restorative justice represents an unrealistic and illusory view of resolving conflicts in 
criminal justice; for Geeraets, restorative justice is fictitious, while Acorn argues that it has 
relevance as a fantasy or illusion (utopian).151 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I will explain these criticisms by Acorn and 
Geeraets.  In the third section of this chapter, I will provide a defense of Braithwaite’s version of 
restorative justice against these criticisms.  I will show that restorative justice does not rely on 
compassion or the forced emotions of the victim and offender involved in a conflict. I will show 
that restorative justice necessarily requires the voluntary consent of the parties involved for a 
meeting to commence. In the same vein, the participation or empowerment of both parties as 
stakeholders in the conflict is essential.  Both parties express themselves in terms of their 
experiences and are actively engaged in the resolution process. Employing the idea of respect for 
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another's opinions through active listening naturally allows for the possibility of forgiveness and 
apology.  
Braithwaite’s idea of freedom as nondomination is important, but it needs development to 
address the criticisms by Acorn and Geeraets fully. I will argue that a Kantian understanding of 
concepts like freedom and dignity are consistent with Braithwaite’s views on restorative justice 
and can be incorporated in such a way as to make Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice more 
defensible.  Kantian concepts of freedom and dignity emphasize our rational nature and the 
importance of treating others as ends in themselves.  Both notions are crucial to supporting a 
defensible view of restorative justice that can highlight the role that reason plays in restorative 
justice processes, while also emphasizing the importance of respecting the dignity of all people in 
restorative practice.   For Kant, all rational beings have inherent and absolute worth and dignity, 
and this dignity must be respected in all our actions.  As a result, a Kantian approach to restorative 
justice must firmly support the voluntary choices of all people and encourage rational deliberation 
in all people involved.  Kant does not deny that we have emotions and that emotions may help or 
make it more difficult to perform our duty.  However, he is firmly opposed to the view that 
emotions determine our moral responsibility, and he would be opposed to any process that works 
to emotionally manipulate people to achieve certain ends (this would treat people as a mere means 
to these ends).  I will argue that this Kantian modification on Braithwaite’s views of freedom and 
dignity will help defend Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice against criticisms by Acorn 
and Geeraets.   
 
3.1  Acorn’s Criticisms 
Acorn reflects on why she abandoned a restorative justice approach. Acorn in her book 
states “in as much as I was drawn to this project of trying to find a nicer way of doing justice, as 
much as I tried to affect the necessary new coupling of justice and right relation, I couldn’t quite 
do it.”152  She describes her experience as an advocate for restorative justice as one which was not 
favorable or positive. The more Acorn sought to defend restorative justice, the more she 
encountered problems.  
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One of Acorn’s first problems that she encountered when she was an advocate for 
restorative justice was the difficulty to “walk the walk.”153  Acorn argues that:  
 
Restorative Justice seemed just fine for other people, for harms I had 
not suffered, but when it came to me, restorative justice was not what I 
wanted. I did not feel competent as an advocate for restorative justice 
because I doubted both my ability to repair relationships marred by 
wrongdoing and my commitments to doing so.154  
 
Although Acorn could ‘talk the talk’ of restorative justice, she found it difficult to ‘walk the walk’ 
herself.  Acorn thought that restorative justice sounded right and practicable when she listened to 
the story of restorative justice being applied to others.  But when she put herself in the shoes of 
victims or people that were harmed by crime and wrongdoing, she found it much more difficult to 
do or even to want to do.  Acorn explains that if she considered cases where she was a victim, for 
instance, she is in doubt if she would be able to forgive wrongdoers or even want to try to forgive 
them.   
Acorn adds another feature to her criticism of restorative justice by arguing that the practice 
anchors on or depends on the right relationship between (or being in right relations with) the parties 
involved in a conflict. Acorn explains that in our day to day lives, there are right and wrong 
relations or relationships.155 The right ones are easy to maintain as they characterize, “spontaneous 
affinity, shared purpose…”156 The wrong relations were “marred by resentment, bitterness, small-
mindedness…”157 There is also a difference between reconciliation between those we have 
relationships with (whether in right or wrong relations) and those that we have only relations with 
as a result of a crime.  Acorn explains: 
 
 I was far less cheery about the possibility for recompense, 









was in the context of relations between murderers, burglars, sexual 
abusers, even the most heinous of war criminals and their victims.158  
 
The idea here is that even with wrong-doing that is less serious than crimes (for instance, two 
friends having a little quarrel), wrongdoing is not easy to forgive. How much more difficult would 
it be to reconcile when the relationship is problematic (like the case of domestic partners involved 
in an abusive relationship)?  Furthermore, how can one expect forgiveness and restoration when 
we are dealing with assault, theft, and even murder by a stranger?  Acorn believes that the rhetoric 
of restorative justice was evoking the fantasy of idealized harmony in the relationship between 
victims and perpetrators of crime before the wrongdoing.  However, often the ‘relationship’ 
between victim and offender is purely injury-generated, and any further development of a 
relationship is not even remotely desired by either party, least of all by the victim.159    
According to Acorn, restorative justice’s appeal to harmony between both parties is not 
attainable or even desirable; it is an illusion. For instance, consider the case where an offender kills 
the child of a victim and is asked to attend a conference willingly. Even if the victim attends 
voluntarily, in what sense could the victim be said to seek to be in harmony with the killer of his 
or her child? Acorn would say that this is not a realistic expectation for any defensible response to 
crime.  Is it even a morally acceptable thing to ask of victims that they should seek harmony with 
the killer of their child? She asks, “Can we in good conscience support a system that would 
encourage the subjection of victims to this kind of intense intimacy with those who have harmed 
them?”160  
Acorn does seem to acknowledge that restorative justice processes seem more plausible in 
dealing with young offenders.  For example, Acorn argues that in terms of juvenile crime, “…we 
are more willing to see the wrongdoing of the youth as attributable to lack of maturity rather than 
to actual malevolence or viciousness…, and give the young every reasonable chance to redeem 
themselves.”161  Thus, when it comes to juvenile crime as opposed to adult offenders, there is a 
reluctance to pass punitive judgments and an openness to try restorative approaches. There is the 
hope that the young offender acted out of ignorance and that young people can change their ways 
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“…through better education and socialization.”162 She further argues that “youth puts us in the 
optimistic mood for restorative justice.”163   
However, despite this optimism, she is also concerned that the possibility of emotional 
manipulation and emotional coercion is even greater in young people.  Restorative justice 
processes need offenders to be in the right frame of mind for restorative justice to work plausibly.  
Acorn states: 
 
Restorative justice is possibly the perfect solution to crime where the 
offenders have the capacity for serious critical self-reflection, the 
resources and ability to repair the damage caused, and the Bonafide 
desire along with sufficient self-command to behave respectfully in 
their relations with their victims and community in future.164  
 
Acorn is questioning whether most offenders are in this right frame of mind and whether it is 
reasonable to expect most offenders to have the capacity for severe critical self-reflection.  Since 
Acorn holds that, “…at the end of the day, the primary control over the success or failure of 
restorative justice seems to lie in the hand of the offender,”165 the chances for success for most 
restorative justice processes seem slim at best. 
3.2 Geeraets’ Criticism of Restorative Justice 
According to Geeraets, the arguments by restorative justice scholars like Braithwaite and 
Walgrave show that restorative justice is rooted or grounded in the foundations of harmony, 
respect, and empowerment.166 He argues that these ideas proceed from several claims which are 
fictitious.  But he also argues that these fictions are not merely a mistake; they serve an essential 
function in restorative justice practice. The point he makes is that the participants need to believe 
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in these fictions for the conflict resolution process to come to a proper conclusion.167Geeraets 
presents the following three central claims that he unmasks as fictions: 
 
The offender and victim in the restorative justice conference participate 
voluntarily, the offender and the victim take on active responsibility and 
that the preparatory tasks in which the parties agree are not meant to 
harm the offender.168  
 
Geeraets sums up these three fictitious claims under the headings of “voluntariness, active 
responsibility, and no infliction of harm.”169 These three fictitious elements are the focus of his 
criticisms of restorative justice.  The first point Geeraets raises is a concern that all the parties that 
attend restorative justice conferences should do so voluntarily. Secondly that all parties involved 
should be able to take ‘active responsibility’ at all stages of a restorative justice process.  Finally, 
the resolution of restorative justice process and the agreements reached should involve no infliction 
of harm (or punishment) on the offender.   
First, what is Geeraets’ concern about the notion of ‘voluntariness’ in restorative justice 
approaches?  Geeraets argues that “within the ideal of restorative justice, there is an aspiration to 
secure the voluntary participation of the various parties, but this aspiration cannot be fully 
accomplished in practice.”170  The point he tries to make here is that the voluntary participation 
argument has more grounding when it relates to the offender, and is unattainable in practice. 
Concerning the offender, he explains that the restorative justice conference is “akin to the example 
of a forced marriage.”171 Here, the offender mandatorily partakes in the meeting as he faces a 
choice of either attending a criminal justice sentencing trial or the conference. Geeraets expresses 
that the ability to make choices for the offender is limited.172 The two provided options make him 
pick the conference over the traditional system of judicial sentencing mostly because the latter 
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In terms of the victim, Geeraets explains that “traditionally the role of the victim in the 
formal arena of the criminal law has been minimal.”173 It means that the victim (in practice) cannot 
decide whether the offender should be prosecuted, let alone be convicted. Traditionally, the victim 
also has little influence over the sentencing, except to provide victim impact statements.  By rightly 
quoting Christie, he also argues that “he is not the owner of the conflict.”174 Geeraets agrees that 
for restorative justice practice to be right, the participation of the victim is necessary.175  Geeraets’ 
view is such that with restorative justice as an alternative, the “picture is fictitious.”176 Both victim 
and offender are forced directly or indirectly to participate in a “positive and reasonable 
manner.”177 He gives an example of a young offender. The point for him is that the facilitator can 
easily convince a person in such cases because it is easier to manipulate a young person to make 
certain decisions. 
Second, what is Geeraets’ concern about the notion of ‘active responsibility’ in restorative 
justice accounts?  On his active responsibility argument, Geeraets explains that participants in the 
conference are depicted in restorative justice conferences as stakeholders because they are 
considered to be in control of the restorative justice process and can determine its outcome.178 The 
point here is that restorative justice processes are geared towards the feature of empowerment as 
it relates to the parties involved. The victim and offender are said to be in active control of the 
process. It means that “…the restorative justice conference invites the parties to behave like 
virtuous agents…virtue in this context entails a willingness to participate in the conference, to be 
proactive and positive, and to attempt to reach an agreement that is both reasonable and just.179  
 It is in this context that Geeraets refers to the “fictional example provided by 
Braithwaite.”180 Geeraets rightly explains that for the offender, Sam to be actively responsible, 
“…it will ideally have been his choice to participate, to apologize and to make reparations, which 
entail him having sufficient scope in which to operate independently.”181 The point is that Sam did 
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not have to succumb to the emotional appeal of his sister to participate in the conference. One can 
say Sam’s choice is based on his free choice of action; only without this emotional coercion would 
Sam be actively responsible for his choice of being engaged in the conference. Geeraets argues 
that the offender, Sam, is brought into “a state of vulnerability so that his choice to apologize and 
his agreement to make reparations seem genuine.”182 In other words, Sam is not an autonomous 
agent since he was convinced and coerced emotionally by his sister.  
As stated earlier in the first chapter, there are two ways of interpreting the appeal to emotion 
as it relates to Sam in this case. Firstly, the appeal to emotion can be based on mere manipulation. 
In such a scenario, emotion is devoid of one’s application of reason. This is because emotion 
devoid of reason does not portray one as an individual actively involved in making informed 
decisions. My concern lies in emotion as a mere tool of manipulation. On the other hand, emotional 
responses backed up by reason helps one to be more rational. For instance in the case of Sam, the 
emotional response from his sister could result in a spur of guilt in Sam. This awakens his ability 
to see that his actions were wrong.  Not wanting to be such a person,  he is aided by this emotion 
to see how to act better in the future.  
Further, this depiction of a restorative justice process implied that this emotional 
vulnerability is necessary for a genuine apology and agreement to occur. On the part of the victim, 
Geeraets explains that the emotional exchange also coerced Sam into connecting with his sister.  
However, this also undermines Sam’s active responsibility in his choice to connect with his sister. 
Third, and finally, what is Geeraets concern about the notion of not inflicting harm in 
restorative justice accounts?  Geeraets explains that restorative scholars generally state that 
“…these tasks should not be understood in terms of intentional infliction of harm. Reparation, 
therefore, is not punishment.”183 In other words, most scholars of restorative justice hold that the 
tasks undertaken by the offender should not be viewed as punishment, but instead should be viewed 
as restorative. Geeraets argues that since it is compulsory to partake in the conference, then the 
reparatory task constitutes harm.184  For  Geeraets, the offender is being harmed because either 









provided to the offender is the harm in itself. Geeraets’ argument is that the making of a distinction 
between intentional infliction of punishment and the deliberate infliction of a reparative or 
restorative task is overly subtle. If there is a distinction, it is questionable whether it is morally 
relevant. Consequently, the claim that restorative justice can proceed without inflicting harm or 
punishment is fiction. I disagree with this view because as an equally rational being, the offender’s 
decision is as a result of free choice and not manipulation, as Geeraets proposes. I will challenge 
this view that Geeraet presents in the next subchapter. 
 
3.3  Defending Braithwaite’s Version against Geeraets and Acorn’s 
Criticisms With a Kantian Modification of Dignity and Freedom 
Even though Immanuel Kant is explicitly a retributivist, I will argue that the Kantian 
concepts of dignity and freedom are helpful in explaining and defending the idea of restorative 
justice. The importance of the concept of freedom as it relates to human dignity is helpful in 
understanding the philosophical grounds for restorative justice and for defending Braithwaite’s 
version of restorative justice against the main criticisms by Acorn and Geeraets.  
According to Kant,  
 
[Punishment by a court] must always be inflicted upon [the criminal] 
only because he has committed a crime…He must previously have been 
found punishable (strafbar)  before any thought can be given to drawing 
from his punishment something of use for himself or his fellow 
citizens.185 
 
As we saw in section 2.2 of my thesis, Kant can be interpreted as a crude retributivist.  He holds 
the view that offenders are punished not for any consequence, such as deterring future crimes or 
to reform the criminal but rather for the sake of punishing because punishment is right in itself. It 
is derivable from Kant’s view that anyone who does that which is wrong deserves to suffer.186 
Interestingly, Kant holds the view that punishing those who break the law is not just allowable but 
 
185 Kant, I. Metaphysics of Morals. M.J Gregor, Trans. New-York: (Cambridge University Press, 1996),pp. 140-1;331-
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morally required.   However, these views are expressed as part of Kant’s political position, which 
assumes a social contract approach to matters of justice.  Kant’s ethical views can be interpreted 
independently of his explicit views on punishment and retribution. 
Kant, in his ethics, explains that for an action to be morally worthy, it must be done from 
respect for the moral law.  The moral law is rational, capable of being conceived and willed by 
rational beings.  A rational human being is, for Kant, a being capable of acting and willing 
universal laws.  In this way, a rational being is an autonomous or free being. According to Kant, 
 
The will is thought of as a faculty of determining itself to act following the 
representation of certain laws, as such a faculty can be found only in rational beings 
and that only a rational being has the power to act according to his conception of 
laws, i.e., according to principles and thereby he has a will. Since the derivation of 
actions from laws requires a reason, the will is nothing but practical reason, and the 
will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, 
recognizes as being practically necessary, i.e., as good.187 
 
In this quotation, Kant explains how our choice in terms of actions works. He explains that a 
rational being has the power to act based on his conception of what is right or wrong. Our ability 
to employ reason practically enables us to originate from our actions from within ourselves. We 
dictate the rules of behavior for ourselves, and we should never treat ourselves or others as a mere 
means to achieve some result. 
Kant holds the view that “Autonomy is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself 
independently of any property of the objects of the violation.”188 He is expressing the idea that 
autonomy is self-law giving and is possessed by the rational being who has the free will to make 
his own choices devoid of any external influence. Moral freedom “entails the capacity to give 
oneself the moral law, rather than merely heeding to the injunction of others.”189 The point here is 
that rationality is that which enables a person to be an autonomous moral agent; in situations where 
autonomy does not function as an ideal, agents who do not meet specific criteria of being rational 
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are not autonomous. For instance, people with a significant cognitive disability or little children 
who cannot think clearly, make decisions, and act autonomously are not rational beings. Kant 
expresses that “moral autonomy entails having authority over one’s actions rather than letting the 
principles by which we make others determine our decisions.”190 In Kant’s essay on enlightenment, 
he describes enlightenment as the human beings' emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.  
Kant views dignity (Wurde) as an end in itself. This concept of dignity for Kant involves 
“A two-level model of being an end in itself.”191 In the first sense, dignity means that every human 
has intrinsic value because every human being has goodwill and, therefore, the capacity to be 
moral. Because of this, every human being is an end in itself and has to be respected. Thus, Kant’s 
view is that every human being has dignity and that dignity ought to be acknowledged in all our 
actions.  In the second sense, Kant talks about the dignity of “the way of thinking.”192 In this same 
regard, Kant often explains that humans are  superior to animals because of the quality they possess 
that entails a particular “absolute value.”193 Thus, if we accept a Kantian approach to respecting 
the dignity of all people within a restorative justice process, then we must oppose the appeal to 
mere emotions as a way of compelling agreements or even apologies. 
If we understand Braithwaite’s appeal to dignity and freedom in restorative justice 
processes as involving these Kantian notions, then I believe that we can have a view of restorative 
justice that can better emphasize the role that emotion, backed up by reason, plays within 
restorative justice processes and the importance of voluntary choice for all participants.  Although 
Kant believed that emotions should be cultivated in such a way that can help us perform our moral 
duty (rather than cultivating emotions that hinder us), emotions do not determine our moral duty. 
Thus, if we accept a Kantian approach to respecting the dignity of all people within a restorative 
justice process, then we must oppose the appeal to mere emotion as a way of compelling 
agreements or even apologies. Further, we should encourage participants to rationally deliberate 
about their actions and what they ought to do;  only by acting for the right reasons can people 
behave morally. Finally, we should firmly maintain that voluntary participation in the process is 
necessary.  Any account of restorative justice that forces offenders into participating in restorative 
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justice processes (like that of Christie’s account) undermines the values that are central to 
restorative justice, values that respect the dignity and freedom of all people. 
 How can this Kantian modification of Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice help 
respond to criticisms by Geeraets and Acorn?  I will group Geeraets and Acorn’s criticisms into 
three main parts.  First, I will respond to the criticisms challenging the voluntary nature of 
participation in restorative justice processes.  Second, I will respond to criticisms regarding the 
role of emotions (i.e., the claim that the victims and offenders in restorative justice processes are 
emotionally manipulated or coerced). Third, I will respond to the criticism that restorative justice 
processes are over-idealized or illusory.  These are the common points shared by both critiques.  
 First, in terms of voluntary consent in Restorative justice conferences, there is the view that 
“restorative processes should be used only with the free and voluntary consent of the parties. The 
parties should be able to withdraw such consent at any time during the process. Agreements should 
be arrived at voluntarily by the parties...”194 Geeraets argues that “within the ideal of restorative 
justice, there is an aspiration to secure the voluntary participation of the various parties, but that 
this aspiration cannot be fully accomplished in practice.”195 Geeraets explains that the offender is 
left to choose between the criminal law system or the restorative justice conference. For him, it is 
easier for the offender to go for the conference since the criminal justice system is coercive. He 
also expresses that restorative justice exerts pressure on the victim to participate positively and 
reasonably; as a result, restorative justice is fictitious.196  Acorn holds a similar view that offenders 
feel forced to participate in restorative justice practices, while victims are forced to confront those 
that have victimized them. 
  In response to this first criticism, I would argue that only a radical version of restorative 
justice, a version that calls for the complete replacement of the Western criminal legal system with 
restorative justice would ‘force’ all offenders and victims into participating in a restorative justice 
process.  Since Braithwaite’s version does provide a system that includes both kinds of processes, 
there is no need to force either the offender or the victim into a restorative justice process.  Further, 
just because the choice for an offender is limited between two options does not mean that the 
offender lacks free choice. All choices that we face in life are limited.  The limitations of options 
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for our choices do not undermine our ability to choose freely. Finally, although, restorative justice 
practices often lead victims to sympathize with offenders, no responsible advocate of restorative 
justice requires forgiveness from the victim as a necessary part of restorative justice. A coerced or 
mandatory “compassion’ or ‘forgiveness’ undermines the genuine nature of compassion and 
forgiveness.  Thus, Braithwaite explains that 
 
Virtual, yet subsidiary restorative justice values like forgiveness an 
apology are not values we actively seek people to manifest in the way 
we do seek to actively persuade respectful listening. Forgiveness and 
apology are gifts; that only have meaning and power if they are freely 
chosen by those who give them in response to an injustice yet the theory 
of restorative justice is that by creating safe spaces where people listen 
respectfully to the stories of others about the injustices they believe they 
have suffered, forgiveness and apology are more likely to issue.197 
 
The point here is that active listening and communication by both parties would naturally 
result in both parties showing sympathy for each other. The victim and offender, through respectful 
and effective listening and respect for each other's dignity, can make their choices independently 
of how they might be feeling. This act of active listening is supported by what Braithwaite calls 
freedom non-domination.198 Here the parties involved in a crime are heard without any of their 
voices being dominated and have their views respected in terms of their narration of how crime 
made them feel and what is to be done to heal the hurt. This restorative justice element reinstates 
Kant’s view on human dignity, which states that humans have dignity and that dignity should be 
respected.  
In terms of the second kind of criticism, pertaining to the potentially coercive or 
manipulative role of emotions in restorative justice processes, I would argue that this criticism is 
based upon the problematic story of Sam given by Braithwaite (see section 1.3).  As I did in my 
earlier analysis of this story, I would like to point out first that the example presented by 
Braithwaite does not portray restorative justice in its strongest light. This is because,  in order to 
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be effective, the restorative justice process must be voluntary and not compulsory. With a Kantian 
understanding of Braithwaite’s views on freedom and dignity, I can maintain that restorative 
justice processes ought to emphasize that human beings are rational beings who possess the ability 
to make decisions and choose their mode of actions.  I  believe even in the story of Sam, who 
happens to be a teenager, he could have employed his rationality to choose whether to engage in 
the conference. 
Consequently, Sam could have been responsible for his offense and could reach an 
agreement with the victim. His decisions need not be compelled or invoked by emotions. Sam 
could have recognized reasons to be engaged in the conference after engaging his thought process. 
One does not need to be brought into a state of emotional vulnerability to rationally deliberate and 
to make decisions. The point is that in restorative justice, the parties involved in a conflict are 
autonomous persons who own the conflict and can reach an agreement based on reason; it does 
not necessarily have to involve the mere emotions on the part of either party.  
This is not to deny that emotions are a part of restorative justice processes.  They 
undeniably will be a part of the restorative justice process because emotions are an undeniable part 
of human life.  And when it comes to cases of crime, where someone has been seriously harmed, 
often conflicting and intense emotions will undoubtedly arise.  The presence of strong emotions 
will be a part of any process dealing with responses to crime.  However, restorative justice 
acknowledges these strong emotions and provides ways to deal with them.  A young person who 
is robbed on the street and a young offender who is arrested for stealing in a bank will feel all sorts 
of emotions (sadness, anger, resentment, shame, etc.).  Managing these strong feelings, especially 
feelings of shame and powerlessness, are part of the concerns of a restorative justice process.  But 
when emotions are recognized and managed, they can help us in doing what is right.  In this way, 
reason and emotion can work hand in hand to help people come to the right decision. The mere 
presence of emotions does not make one’s choices or decisions less autonomous; the important 
thing is not to let emotions alone dictate your decisions. 
The third and final criticism by Acorn and Geeraets deals with the overly idealized or 
illusory nature of restorative justice processes.  On Acorn’s view of restorative justice practice 
anchored on the idealized harmony of right relations between victim and offenders of crime. She 
explains that “the seductive vision of restorative justice is: right relation, Reciprocity, Healing, and 
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repair.”199 For Geeraets, “…the restorative justice conference invites the parties to behave like 
virtuous agents…virtue in this context entails a willingness to participate in the conference, to be 
proactive and positive, and to attempt to reach an agreement that is both reasonable and just.200  
Both Acorn and Geeraets see a highly idealized process involved in restorative justice, expecting 
all participants to be capable of morally exemplary behavior.  Is restorative justice expecting far 
too much from offenders and victims of crime?  How realistic are the goals of restorative justice? 
Like any other theory, some overly enthusiastic scholars make unrealistic claims about 
restorative justice practice. Sometimes they make excessive claims that result in false expectations. 
With this in mind, it is easy to understand a cynical response to restorative justice.201 The point is 
that restorative justice practice, like any other theory of justice, is prone to theoretical illusions. As 
Braithwaite rightly points out that some restorative justice advocates do not even believe that 
restorative justice is merely an improvement; they think their program is perfect.202 The idea of 
advocating for a theory by describing it as  ideal, or as processes without flaws and a high level of 
success is very tempting. But this temptation should be avoided since it makes restorative justice 
easy to ridicule and criticize. Restorative justice should be described with all its flaws and 
limitations. All responses to crime, whether we are talking about proposals made by proportionate 
retributivists or restorative justice advocates, will have weaknesses and limitations.   
Further, since any response to crime takes place in a social context, the problems with 
society have an impact on any proposed process for dealing with crimes. In other words, there are 
social justice issues that affect the restorative justice practice as they would impact on any other 
practice. Restorative justice practice should not be characterized as a process devoid of dishonesty, 
greed, and discrimination (racism, sexism, or colonialism). All the biases that are found within 
society at large may be a part of any process within society, and work must be done to ensure that 
justice is done within the restorative justice process. To his credit, Braithwaite acknowledges many 
of the limitations of restorative justice processes (especially more so than Christie).  He also is 
more aware of the limitations of restorative justice, especially when it comes to dealing with social 
injustice.   
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In an article dealing specifically with restorative justice and social injustice, Braithwaite 
writes, “…restorative justice cannot resolve the deep structural injustices that cause problems…but 
we must demand two things here. First, it must not make structural injustice worse. Second, 
“restorative justice should restore harmony with a remedy grounded in dialogue which takes 
account of underlying injustices”203 Thus, Braithwaite is acknowledging that restorative justice 
cannot solve the deep structural injustices (like the growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, 
systemic racism and sexism, and colonialism).  But it can try not to make things worse in this 
regard.   
For example, restorative justice processes must be aware of these power dynamics and 
biases within its operations, and not let restorative justice processes be used to widen the gap 
between the wealthy and the poor or between the white majority and visible minorities.  
Braithwaite also believes that restorative justice can contribute to a part of the issue of social 
injustice by advocating for alternative resolutions besides incarceration for responses to crime.  
Since visible minorities and indigenous people are disproportionately incarcerated in places like 
Canada, restorative justice practices have the potential to address a part of this problem by 
supporting an approach that seeks alternative kinds of responses to crime than imprisonment.  But 
Braithwaite adds that by promoting the discussion of crime within the community and community 
groups (like schools or churches), Braithwaite sees the potential of promoting dialogue about 
social injustice within the community.  Again, restorative justice processes cannot be expected to 
solve all that is wrong with society and should not be represented as if it can; however, restorative 
justice has the potential to provide some indirect forms of support for those fighting social 
injustice. 
Interestingly, Acorn and Geeraets give examples using young offenders to show that they 
can be more easily emotionally manipulated to participate and arrive at an agreement at a 
conference. Geeraets expresses:  
 
If, for example, the offender is a minor, the facilitator can appeal, 





people. The victim may also be that it is in his best interest to attend the 
conference.204 
 
Acorn, in the same vein, argues:  
 
We are more willing to see the Wrongdoing of the youth as attributable 
to lack of maturity rather than to actual malevolence or viciousness of 
the juvenile criminal whose life stretches out before him. We are 
reluctant to abandon hope either for the possibility of spontaneous 
change of young offender's ways or for their improvement through 
better education and socialization. To presume that a youthful offender 
does not deserve a chance to make amends seems culpably cynical just 
as it seems culpably naive to give adult offenders the benefits of the 
same set of doubts.205 
 
Acorn is right in her view that “the youth puts us in the optimistic mood necessary for 
restorative justice.”206  So, on the one hand, it seems that the age of young people makes one feel 
more optimistic about the effectiveness and use of restorative justice processes.  On the other hand, 
it appears that the age of young people can also be a source of problems for restorative justice 
since one could argue that young people are more easily manipulated or more prone to emotional 
“vulnerability” as Geeraets puts it. However, I would argue that youth does not make young 
offenders any less rational, easily deceived, or unable to make decisions. After all, the act of 
committing the crime was based on free choice. There was the option to do or not to do it, and 
young offenders are still considered responsible for their actions.  If so, they also can be 
accountable for their decisions and choices in restorative justice conferences.  They may have 
strong emotions, but this does not mean that emotions must rule them. This process aims to 
cultivate circles of support around offenders and victims. 
In as much as young people should be held accountable for the crimes they commit, they 
are still in their developing years and are most likely to make mistakes than adult offenders. Most 
of these young adults are still in the care of a guardian or parent. As such, it makes it easier to 
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restore such people who can even be supported by the parent and family, based on an agreement 
reached in the conference. In the early learning stage of a person, it is easier to assist a person in 
desisting from wrong ways of doing things than when the person gets older. Young offenders are 




























In this thesis, I have explained the difference between Christie’s radical versions of 
restorative justice in comparison to that of Braithwaite. I have shown that Braithwaite's more 
moderate version, one which acknowledges a role for some aspects of the criminal legal system, 
represents a better picture of restorative justice practice. However, Braithwaite's version of 
restorative justice has two main kinds of deficiencies that require remedy.   
First, Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice does not fully explain its opposition to 
“retributivism” since it fails to acknowledge different kinds or senses of what retributivism entails.  
Thus, in this thesis, I appealed to Hart’s account of the different kinds of retributivism to provide 
a sense of how Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice is, no doubt, opposed to crude 
retributivism, but has a role of a modified version of proportionate retributivism in distribution to 
act as a check on restorative processes.  I have also shown that Braithwaite is opposed to all 
versions of retributivism conceived as a justification of the general justifying aim of the system, 
but not completely opposed to a modified version of proportionate retributivism in distribution.  
Second, Braithwaite’ story of Sam provides a distorted view of restorative justice practice 
and makes it more easily subject to criticisms by Acorn and Geeraets.  However, with a Kantian 
understanding of dignity and freedom, I defended the criticism of restorative justice being an 
overly idealistic theory grounded in emotional appeal.  Thus, I am advocating the Kantian 
modification of Braithwaite's view on freedom (as nondomination) and dignity, and, hence, a 
Kantian modification of Braithwaite’s version of restorative justice. I have shown that rational 
beings are responsible for the choices they make and this enables them to carry out their choice of 
action freely through reason and not based solely on emotional appeal per se. Also, emotions 
cannot fully be taken out of the picture because healing, hurt, justice, and restoration are concepts 
of restorative justice practices that directly or indirectly entail emotional responses; the same 
applies in the criminal justice system. 
Importantly, there are still questions that require answers but are beyond the scope of this 
study. Restorative justice scholars, including Braithwaite, do not adequately explain punishment 
and its application in restorative justice practice. As we saw in Chapter 2 of this thesis, it is difficult 
to characterize punishment in a value-neutral or morally neutral fashion.  As a result, restorative 
justice proponents cannot easily answer the question of whether restorative justice practice is 
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opposed to punishments or opposed to punitive responses to crime unless it can first explain what 
is meant by punishment.   
There are also issues involving the criticisms of restorative justice as it relates to social 
justice issues that have not been adequately pursued in this thesis.  Social injustice and crime are 
connected in many troubling ways, and so is social injustice and responses to crime. The biases 
and discriminations facing historically disadvantaged groups within our society also impact on 
responses to crime, including restorative justice processes.  Braithwaite was explicitly aware of 
this possibility, and thus he emphasized a notion of freedom as non-domination involving 
respectful listening, as well as the importance of respecting diversity in organizing restorative 
justice processes.  Although he argued that awareness of the larger power dynamics within society 
is crucial for the organization of restorative justice processes, eliminating biases and discrimination 
is easier said than done.  The actual extent to which restorative justice processes have or have not 
addressed the biases and discriminations common within society is an important empirical 
question that needs to be addressed.  It is my hope that the arguments in this thesis will provide 
some of the theoretical framework needed before considering these important empirical questions.                                             
Finally, there was much discussion in Christie and Braithwaite on the role of community.  
To adequately pursue this topic would take me far beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, this 
is not to say that this topic is not important.  The fragmentation of modern society and the 
undermining of social groups like the family, churches, and other social groups is a concern and a 
concern related to crime.  How restorative justice can contribute to a restoration of communities 
requires careful consideration of the nature of the community and its value, as well as connected 
considerations of the nature of family and other social groups.  Humans are not only individuals 
but also social beings that need a sense of belonging. They are members of a relational network 
that can be extended into a family, which is the bedrock of society.  I believe that a community-
powered view of restorative justice, one that also acknowledges the importance of the strong 
supports of families, would produce less delinquent children. I believe that the family is the 
bedrock of every kind of society that exists today.  However, more research is needed for me to 
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